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FAMILY LEAVE AND THE GENDER WAGE
GAP
MICHAEL SELMI*
In this Article, Professor Selmi argues that the key to achieving
greater gender equality in the workplace is finding a way to change
the behavior of men so that their labor force patterns become
more similar to women's. Professor Selmi begins the Article by
analyzing the latest data and concludes that the gender pay gap
reflects women's actual labor market behavior as well as
employers' exaggerated responses to the expectation that women
will leave the labor force to have and to raise children. Breaking
up these patterns, he contends, will require developing better, and
different, family leave legislation. Through an analysis of the
existing legislation, Professor Selmi demonstrates that the Family
and Medical Leave Act falls far short of providing the kind of
relief that might improve gender inequality. He concludes the
Article by proposing that the leave law be amended with an eye on
equality, specifically by creating a contract set-aside program to
reward employers for establishing generous leave policies that
succeed in getting men to take more parental leave.
INTRODUCrION ....................................................................................... 708
I. UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER WAGE GAP .......................... 714
A. The Human Capital Explanation ......................................... 718
1. Education, Experience, and Training ........................... 719
2. The Question of Hours ................................................... 723
3. Marriage, Children, and Housework ............................ 725
4. Women's Labor Force Attachment .............................. 730
B. The Issue of Choice ............................................................... 736
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Earlier versions of
this Article were presented at the 1999 Law and Society Conference, at Villanova Law
School, and at a faculty workshop at George Washington University Law School. I am
grateful for the comments I received at those presentations, as well as for helpful
comments on prior drafts from Naomi Calm, Charlie Craver, Catherine Fisk, Rick
Geddes, Larry Mitchell, Wendy Parker, Jonathan Walker, Joan Williams, and Larry
Zelenak. Eun-gyoung Shin provided excellent research assistance, and Leslie Lee
contributed tremendously with her indefatigable library assistance. During the writing of
this Article my daughter Fiona was born, and this is for her with the hope that hers will be
a more equal world.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
C. The Role of Statistical Discrimination ................................. 743
1. The Theory of Statistical Discrimination ..................... 744
2. Is Statistical Discrimination Justified? ................ . . .. . . .. . . 745
3. The Need for Government Intervention ...................... 750
D. M en and Family Leave ......................................................... 755
II. THE FAwmY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT AND GENDER
STEREOTYPES ............................................................................... 759
A. The Family Medical Leave Act ............................................ 760
1. A Statutory Overview ..................................................... 760
2. The Effect of the FMLA ................................................ 761
B. The FM LA in Action ............................................................ 763
1. The Use of the FM LA .................................................... 763
2. Evaluating the Effect of the Statute .............................. 765
III. BRINGING EQUALITY TO THE WORKPLACE ............................ 767
A. The Idea of Tax Reform ................................................ 768
B. Fixing the FMLA with an Eye on Equality ......................... 770
1. The Need for Paid Leave ............................................... 770
2. Requiring Men to Take Leave ....................................... 773
3. Creating a Set-Aside Program for Family Leave ........ 775
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 781
INTRODUCTION
The patterns tied to both the reality and the assumptions
regarding women's behavior in the labor force suggest that if there is
to be greater equality for women in the workplace, it will be
necessary for men to change their behavior, both in and out of the
workplace, before employers will begin to change theirs. Despite
improvements over the last two decades, gender inequality continues
to pervade, and in many ways define, the American workplace. In
large measure, the problem persists because men have not yet
changed their employment-related behavior, and employers exact
penalties on women not only because of their actual behavior, which
differs from men's, but also because of the presumption that women
will leave the workforce when they have children. Thus, increasing
workplace equality will require persuading men to behave more like
women, rather than trying to induce women to behave more like men.
Achieving this objective would create a new workplace norm where
all employees would be expected to have and spend time with their
children, and employers would adapt to that reality.
These changes are needed more urgently than ever because
workplace inequality has the potential to impact more women than
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ever before. Approximately 75% of women between the ages of
twenty and fifty-four now work,' including nearly 65% percent of
women with children under age six.2  Yet, women on average still
earn between 70% and 75% of what men earn. Working women also
continue to perform between two to three times as much housework
as men, remain overwhelmingly responsible for child rearing, and
occupy different jobs than men.4
Despite dramatic changes in women's work patterns in the last
two decades, American society has failed to make more progress on
issues of gender equity in part because we remain conflicted about
the role that women should play both in the workplace and the
home.5 Although the United States has one of the highest female
labor force participation rates among industrialized countries, it also
has done the least to assist those women with the demands of work
and family.' The United States was one of the last of the
industrialized countries to adopt a family leave law and even today
offers the least generous family leave benefits of any such country.
1. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and Earnings,
Jan. 1999, at 175, tbl.8 (Sup. Docs. No. L 2.41/2-2:4611).
2. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 1998 tbl.4 (1999) (Sup. Docs. No. L 2.118/2:998)
(reporting the labor force participation of women with children). The majority of women
who work, even those with children, work full-time, which is typically measured as 35 or
more hours a week. See id. at tbl.5 (reporting that only 26.2% of women with children
worked part-time). For a discussion of part-time work, see infra notes 93-99.
3. For a discussion of the wage gap, see infra Part I.
4. These issues are discussed in greater detail infra notes 73-77 (discussing
housework), 108-10 (describing occupational segregation) and accompanying text. For a
recent informative discussion on housework, see Chloe E. Bird, Gender, Household Labor
and Psychological Distress: The Impact of the Amount and Division of Housework, 40 J.
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAv. 32, 38 (1999), and for a recent discussion of the question of
occupational segregation, see Francine D. Blau et al., Continuing Progress? Trends in
Occupational Segregation in the United States Over the 1970s and 1980s, 4 FEMINIST ECON.
29 (1998).
5. For example, a 1998 poll found that 40% of the respondents would like to return
to the gender roles of the 1950s. See Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More
Equity, More Sweat, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al (reporting that "4 in 10 of those
surveyed said, it would be better to return to the gender roles of the 1950s").
6. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 49-52 (2000) (discussing leave and child care
policies of other countries). Based on data from the early 1990s, the United States had a
higher female labor force participation rate than all European countries other than
Sweden and also had a considerably higher rate than Australia. See Francine D. Blau &
Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence, in
DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE STRUCrURE 105, 122 tbl.3.4 (Richard B.
Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz eds., 1995).
7. Sociologist Jane Waldfogel recently summarized the legislation:
Until the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993, the United States
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The weakness of our commitment to facilitating work and family
issues can be further highlighted by examining our expenditures on
other workplace benefits. As a society, we spend more than $60
billion annually on workers' compensation, with another $20 billion
devoted to unemployment benefits.8 In addition to these workplace
benefits, we also subsidize health insurance and pensions, as well as
non-workplace items such as home mortgages-all of which cost
billions of dollars annually. Nevertheless, when it comes to
facilitating family leave as a way of providing some balance between
work and family, we spend practically nothing on the federal level,
primarily because we are concerned about the effects the costs might
have on employers and wages.
Increasing our societal commitment to family leave issues is
critically important for at least two closely related reasons. First, if
we are to make greater progress on gender equality in the
workplace-progress that I will demonstrate is still much needed-we
must challenge the existing stereotypes surrounding family leave,
which invariably impact women negatively. As we will see, employers
generally assume that women's work in the home will adversely affect
their performance in the workplace and make employment decisions
accordingly. To close the gender gap further, we need to take steps to
disrupt both the reality and the expectations of how women's relation
to their children affects their labor market behavior. Second, creating
a workplace where it is expected that workers will have, and take care
of, children is essential to furthering our societal interest in the
family.
had no national maternity leave policy, and even now, it is tied with Switzerland
in offering the shortest period of leave-a maximum of twelve weeks. Moreover,
the United States is the only country of [the 15 industrial countries surveyed] that
does not offer some degree of paid leave.
Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with Children, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1998, at 137, 140-41. For a comprehensive review of European and
Canadian leave policies, see KIRSTEN S. WEVER, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
ACT: ASSESSING TEMPORARY WAGE REPLACEMENT FOR FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE 7-11 (Radcliffe Pub. Policy Inst., Changing Work in America Series 1996). Wever
notes that, as of 1989, "[s]ixteen European countries and Canada mandate[d] an average
of 33 weeks of paid maternity/parental leave." Id. at 8.
8. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 829 (4th ed. 1998); Daniel McMurrer & Amy B. Chasanov, Trends in
Unemployment Benefits, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1995, at 30, 30 ("In 1993, more than
$22 billion was paid in [unemployment] benefits."). Legally mandated benefits now
account for nearly 10% of payroll costs. See William J. Wiatrowski, Tracking Changes in
Benefit Costs, COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS, Spring 1999, at 32, 33-34
(noting that legally required costs accounted for 9.6% of payroll costs in 1998, compared
to 4.1% in 1959).
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The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA or "the Act")9 is the
only federal effort to date to provide some relief to working parents.
Because the Act offers such limited benefits-unpaid leave for up to
twelve weeks following the birth or adoption of a child-it has failed
to ease the burden on women, and indeed I shall argue that the Act's
effects likely have been more negative than positive. For example,
the passage of the FMLA in 1993 appears to have curtailed a trend at
the state level toward implementing family leave policies that were
often more generous than the FMLA."° In addition, recent data
indicate that very few workers utilize the federal legislation, and
women are considerably more likely than men to take advantage of
the law. Accordingly, at least in the eyes of employers, family leave
remains a woman's issue, one for which all women are being
penalized in the marketplace.
This latter point relates to the persistence of the gender wage
gap, a central focus of this Article. Contributing to, indeed perhaps
explaining, the bulk of workplace disparities based on gender, is a fact
that stubbornly resists change: women overwhelmingly continue to
be primarily responsible for child care and child rearing. Despite the
passage of the FMLA and despite frequent claims by men that they
would like to be more involved with their families, 2 strikingly few
men take any significant paternity leave or assume equal
9. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387,29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)).
10. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
11. The federal government commissioned two studies to assess the impact of the
FMLA; these studies are summarized in COMMITrEE ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES (1996) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 3.2:F211W89) [hereinafter A
WORKABLE BALANCE]. I discuss this report infra Part ll.B.
12. Nearly every poll suggests that men would like to take more family leave and
would be willing to trade some income for more time with their families. See, e.g., ALAN
WOLFE, ONE NATION AFrER ALL 244 (1998) (noting that many of the respondents
"believed companies that turn employees into workaholics violated the moral principle of
balance, as do people who neglect their family ties for higher income and occupational
prestige"); Ellen Galinsky et al., The Role of Employers in Addressing the Needs of
Employed Parents, 52 J. SOC. ISSUES 111, 116-18 (1996) (reporting survey results
indicating that both men and women would prefer to work less and that both are equally
likely to trade salary for greater child assistance benefits); Lisa Belkin, Old Barriers to
Sexual Equality Seen as Eroding, but Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1989, at Al (reporting
that 40% of men surveyed said they would like to quit their jobs to spend more time with
their children). A recent poll also indicated that men and women strongly support
expanding the Family and Medical Leave Act to cover small employers and to provide
some form of insurance to cover family leave. See National Partnership for Women and
Families, Family Matters: A National Survey of Women and Men, tbl.7 (visited Jan. 17,
2000) <http://www.nationalpartnership.org/survey/survey.htm>.
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responsibility for child rearing. As a result, things have continued for
the most part as they were: women have less of an attachment to the
labor force than men (though the differences are narrowing), miss
more work than men, take more time off when they have children,
and generally work fewer hours. All of these factors contribute to a
cumulative workplace disadvantage that exacts a heavy price in terms
of salary, promotions, and responsibility. 13 Economist Claudia Goldin
recently estimated that only about 13% of college educated women
successfully attained both family and career by midlife.14
Even those women who do not have children, or who exit the
labor market only for a very brief period when they do have children,
are affected adversely by what often is labeled statistical
discrimination-the use of group statistics as a proxy for information,
in this instance the likelihood that more women than men will leave
the workforce to have children with the further assumption that the
accompanying labor force disruption will negatively impact
productivity.
If we are to progress further toward workplace equality, it will be
necessary for men to change their behavior in the labor market by, at
a minimum, taking more leave around the birth or adoption of their
children. Yet, history suggests that accomplishing this change will be
no easy feat. 6 Exhorting men to become more involved in their
family lives or touting the importance of families seems unlikely to
ease the burden on women to any significant extent. To address this
dilemma, I propose that the FMLA be amended so as to create
greater incentives for men to take leave around the birth or adoption
of a child. My proposed amendments vary from forcing men to take
six weeks of paid leave to the less drastic measure of creating a
governmental contract set-aside program aimed at rewarding
employers who succeed in encouraging their employees to take family
13. For an excellent recent discussion of the cumulative disadvantage women
experience in the workplace, see VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW?: THE
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 125-44 (1997).
14. See Claudia Goldin, Career and Family: College Women Look to the Past, in
GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 20, 45-48 (Francine D. Blau &
Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997).
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. Since at least the 1960s, women as a group have altered their labor market
behavior substantially, whereas the change in male behavior has been marginal at best.
See, e.g., JOYCE GELB & MARIAN LIEF PALLEY, WOMEN AND PUBLIC POLICIES:
REASSESSING GENDER POLITICS 211 (1996) (noting that "despite increased social
acceptance of work for women, the role of women in home and family has remained much
the same"); JOAN K. PETERS, WHEN MOTHERS WORK 10 (1997) ("Most women make
more than the necessary changes when they have children; most men make none.").
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leave.17 To justify these proposals, I will demonstrate that outside of
Sweden, where success is higher than anywhere else, though lower
than is often assumed, men have never voluntarily taken significant
amounts of child-related leave and that the disproportionate burden
of child rearing that falls on women explains a substantial portion of
their labor market inequality. Indeed, I will suggest that little short of
forcing men to take leave or creating strong incentives aimed at
employers will suffice to alter workplace patterns in a way that will
enable women to make greater progress.
Equally important, creating ways for men to become more
involved in child rearing could help transform the workplace so that
the female model of the worker, rather than the male model, becomes
the norm. If men begin to act more like women in terms of their
responsibilities toward their children, employers may come to expect
that all of their employees will take part in child rearing and may
become more willing to accommodate that responsibility. Employers
might then begin to view family leave benefits as part of the standard
package of employee benefits, something akin to workers'
compensation or to health and safety regulations, which today are
seen as an integral part of doing business despite their costs.
It is surely possible to address the topic of family leave and
workplace inequality from a number of perspectives. In this Article, I
will concentrate on childbearing leave and will say little directly about
child rearing. I focus on childbearing for two primary reasons, but
there is also a third subsidiary reason that supports my choice. First,
leave following the birth of a child is already part of the policy agenda
as a result of the passage of the FMLA and therefore is currently
involved in the debate over balancing work and family. 8 At this time,
it would be far more difficult to create a workable plan relating to
child rearing, given that raising a child is an ongoing process and less
predictable than childbearing. Second, available data indicate that
much of the inequity that continues to affect women in the workplace
revolves around childbearing rather than child rearing. Most
economic explanations and assumptions regarding why women
receive lower wages are tied to the likelihood that a woman will leave
the workforce after having a child. This is true with respect to the
human capital explanation involving investments in education,
experience, and training, as well as theories of statistical
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. The FMLA was passed in 1993 and is now part of the legal landscape. The FMLA
is discussed infra Part II.
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
discrimination, both of which will be discussed in detail shortly. In
contrast, child rearing appears to play a lesser role in explaining the
source of workplace inequality. That said, the two concepts are not
unrelated, and here I turn to the third reason: if we succeed in
breaking up leave patterns surrounding childbirth, it seems likely that
we will make inroads into the patterns of child rearing as well.
As may be clear already, I intend to focus largely, though not
exclusively, on empirical work originating in economics and
sociology. The gender wage gap has been studied extensively, and,
although the two disciplines approach the issue with different
emphases, both have moved increasingly toward empirical analyses
involving a bounty of available data sources. I concentrate on the
data concerning women in the workplace because it is so rich and
informative, yet too often ignored in legal discussions relating to
gender inequality. A close examination of the data may help liberate
us from some of the reigning myths regarding women's workforce
behavior because women's behavior deviates substantially from what
much of neoclassical economic theory predicts. I also want to
emphasize, however, that the persistence of gender inequality is
about more than economic interests, and necessarily implicates
broader issues of gender roles and power in our society. Improving
on the current conditions will thus, as Nancy Fraser has argued,
require "changing both political economy and culture, so as to undo
the vicious circle of economic and cultural subordination."19
This Article will proceed in three Parts. Part I seeks to
understand the nature and persistence of the gender wage gap by
exploring the data and the various theories that help to explain the
gap. Part II analyzes the effects of the FMLA, including two recent
surveys commissioned by the federal government that provide some
insight into just how little relief the Act actually provides. Part III
discusses various ways in which Congress might amend the Act to
further the goal of reducing workplace inequality.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER WAGE GAP
The most common measure of gender inequality in the
workplace is the ratio of women's wages to men's wages-what is
often referred to as the "gender wage gap." In 1997, women's salaries
averaged between 70% and 76% of men's salaries, depending on the
19. NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
"POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 28 (1997).
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particular measure used.2  These figures represent a substantial
improvement from the level of inequality that persisted through much
of the 1970s, when the wage gap hovered around 60%. Most of this
improvement occurred during the 1980s, however, and the pay gap
has largely stagnated during the last decade.2'
Although the earnings ratio is a wildly popular measure, the
average figures can be somewhat misleading in that they mask
women's increasing heterogeneity and overlook some structural
features of the labor market that may explain the decline in the wage
gap more than does the actual progress of women.' For example, in
today's labor market, older women suffer far greater wage disparity
than younger women; indeed, women entering the labor market
today often begin their careers in salary parity with men, or with
minor wage differentials, and wage disparities tend to arise over
time.13 It is also worth noting that much of the decrease in the wage
20. See Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women's Earnings as Percent of
Men's, 1979-1998 (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http:llwww.dol.gov/dol/wb/public/stats/
main.htm>. To provide an example of how the disparity varies depending on the measure
used, in 1998 the female-to-male ratio for full-time workers measured by hourly wage was
73.2%, the percentage for weekly wages was 76.3%, and the annual ratio was 81.8%. See
id. For a detailed discussion of the gender wage gap, see FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE
ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 134-43 (3d ed. 1998).
21. See BLAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 136 (noting that the earnings ratio measured
by annual earnings "did not increase between 1990 and 1995," while the weekly earnings
ratio has declined since 1993).
22. A number of other interpretive difficulties can arise. For example, focusing on
wage distribution instead of median wages indicates that greater numbers of women are
found at the lowest wage level, while men dominate at the top of the wage scale. See, e.g.,
Annette Bernhardt et al., Women's Gains or Men's Losses? A Closer Look at the
Shrinking Gender Gap in Earnings, 101 AM. J. Soc. 302,306-18 (1995) (analyzing relative
wage distributions as opposed to median earnings). The averages also underreport or do
not measure the full inequalities that are caused by racial disparities in the incomes of
men. As a whole, black men earn considerably less than white men, and wage differences
between black men and black women are smaller than among whites. See DAPHNE SPAIN
& SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND
EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 131-32 (1996) (discussing racial disparities in
income). Thus, including blacks within the averages can actually mask the extent of the
advantage white men have in the labor market. See iL at 135; David A. Cotter et al.,
Occupational Gender Segregation and the Earnings Gap: Changes in the 1980s, 24 SOC.
SCI. RES. 439, 441 (1995) ("For minorities, gender differentials in earnings ... are smaller
than for whites ... ; however, this is because of the disadvantaged position of minority
men and not because of any special privileges for minority women."). Moreover, the
average figures typically include only full-time employees, thus excluding the
disproportionately female-dominated and lower-paid, part-time workforce.
23. For example, in 1995 the earnings ratio for workers aged 25-34 was 77.8%,
whereas the ratio for those aged 45-54 was 58.1%. See BLAU ET AL. supra note 20, at 137;
see also CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 59 (1990) (noting a discrepancy between the
experiences of younger and older women); Margaret Mooney Marini & Pi-Ling Fan, The
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gap during the last decade resulted from factors that were only
tangentially related to the improving labor market position of women.
During the 1980s, for instance, the wages of lower-income men
concentrated in manufacturing jobs fell sharply, particularly when
compared to women in service jobs, whose salaries improved
modestly.2 4 At the same time wages grew significantly among college-
educated workers, and large numbers of college-educated women
entered the workforce during the 1980s. All of these factors
contributed to the decreasing gender wage gap, and a significant
portion of the decrease resulted at least as much from the receding
position of men as from improvements in the labor market conditions
of women.
Despite its limitations, the gender wage gap provides a useful
means of understanding current labor market inequalities, as well as
explaining how the condition of women has improved, or failed to
improve, over time. As impressive as the decrease in wage disparity
may be, a substantial gap between the earnings of men and women
remains-at least 25%, or a quarter of one's salary-and it is
important to try to understand the source of the wage inequalities in
order to understand the role that the law might play in reducing the
disparity further.
Economists tend to view the wage gap as a product of choices
that women make regarding their commitment to the labor market.26
Gender Gap in Earnings at Career Entry, 62 AM. Soc. REV. 588, 597 (1997) (reporting
that women in a study sample earned 84% of men at career entry).
24. See SPAIN & BIANCI-, supra note 22, at 108-10 (discussing the effect of men's
declining wages on the gender gap).
25. See id. at 116-17 (noting that "women were poised by the 1980s to advance in the
labor force and the decade turned out to be a phenomenal one in terms of earnings
improvement for the well educated"); Chinhui Juhn & Kevin M. Murphy, Wage Inequality
and Family Labor Supply, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 72, 78-80 (1997) (documenting that women's
wages increased most dramatically at upper-income levels).
26. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 41-42 (1991) ("Wage
rates are lower for women at least partly because they invest less than men in market
human capital, while the productivity of household time is presumably greater for women
partly because they invest more than men in household capital."); Solomon William
Polachek, Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in
Occupational Structure, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 60, 65-68 (1981) (arguing that women
self-select into occupations that match their preferences). Among many legal analysts, this
theory sometimes is accepted as true without argument or empirical support. See Larry
Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 210 (1992) (asserting that labor market
disparities are the product of "differences in job preferences between males and
females"); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U.
CI. L. REV. 1311, 1315 (1989) (assuming for the purposes of analysis that women invest
less in human capital because they will likely take time out from the labor market).
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Many women leave the labor market for a period of time to have and
to raise children, and this withdrawal from the paid labor force can
adversely affect a woman's career because her skills may deteriorate
with time spent away from work or fail to improve as they would have
if she had stayed in the labor force. The likelihood that a woman may
leave the labor force to have and to care for children may affect her
career decisions in other ways as well. Women may, for example,
choose occupations in which continuous experience is less important
or in which the benefits offered may compensate for lower salaries.27
These career choices may also influence educational choices-the
pursuit of a course of study tailored for a particular career path may
lead to lower salaries, less flexibility, and fewer opportunities for
career progression. These choices, the argument goes, may help
explain the severe segregation that exists in the U.S. labor market,
where it remains rare for a woman to work in a job that is integrated
on the basis of gender. 8
As we will see shortly, the economists' preferred explanations,
which are sketched out briefly above, provide more theoretical than
empirical insight. The extraordinary volume of empirical studies on
the gender wage gap demonstrates that women's choices about
careers, education, and work histories offer limited insight into the
persistent gender differentials that characterize the labor market.
One important reason is that women, as a group, demonstrate great
variability in their work patterns. Although women on average leave
the labor force to bear and care for children more frequently than
their male counterparts, many women do not take such leave.
Furthermore, for the majority of women who do take child-related
leave, their absence from the workplace is typically quite short-too
short, as it turns out, to explain the wage and career penalties that are
being exacted by employers 9 Rather than women's actual labor
market experiences, employers' perceptions of women's attachment
to the labor force appears to offer a better explanation for the
continuing disparities. This expectation or perception is generally
referred to as rational or statistical discrimination, but I hope to
demonstrate that it is a form of discrimination that is not nearly as
rational or efficient as is often assumed. These issues will be
discussed in more detail below.
27. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
28. The issue of occupational segregation is discussed in more detail infra Part I.B.
29. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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A. The Human Capital Explanation
The significant decrease in the wage gap that occurred in the
1980s is often attributed to improvement in women's education,
experience, and training-what are defined as human capital
factors-as well as to a reduction in levels of discrimination." Human
capital explanations suggest that gender differences in job placement
and advancement arise from differences in productivity acquired
through education, labor force experience, and training.31 This
theory, despite its now well-documented empirical shortcomings,32
has had an unusually powerful explanatory force within the law, in
large measure because it seems to accord with common sense.33 After
all, the importance of education is impressed upon us from a young
age, and training and work experience are generally relevant to an
employer's labor market decisions, in particular to their wage-setting
functions.M Accordingly, investing in education and experience are
two ways in which workers seek to enhance their value in the labor
market.
30. See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Swimming Upstream: Trends in the
Gender Wage Differential in the 1980s, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 1, 30-31 (1997) (finding that an
increase in skills, experience, and occupational status explained a large portion of the
decrease in the gender gap); Linda Datcher Loury, The Gender Earnings Gap Among
College-Educated Workers, 50 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 580, 590-91 (1997) (finding an
increase in the market price of women's skills and concluding that it reflects a decrease in
discrimination); Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Industrial Change and the Rising
Importance of Skill, in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 101, 101-32
(Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993) (finding that growth in the market price
of women's skills explained the decrease in the wage gap).
31. For the classic articulation of this theory, see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN
CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, VITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
EDUCATION 15-44 (2d ed. 1975).
32. See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A
Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 978
(1995) (discussing the biological basis for the gender wage gap); Posner, supra note 26, at
1315 (assuming "that even if there is no discrimination ... women will, on average, invest
less than men in human capital"); Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 751, 758-60 (1991) (suggesting that women generally invest less in human capital);
Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market. Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 546-48, 602-11 (1998) (discussing the division of labor
within the household).
34. Of course, our common sense also tells us that the quality of the investments
matters tremendously, hence the importance placed on grades. See McKinley L.
Blackburn & David Neumark, Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the Return to
Schooling, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 521, 528 (1993) (demonstrating that returns on schooling are
significant primarily for those who obtain relatively high levels of academic achievement).
These qualitative issues are very difficult to measure, however, because the necessary data
are often lacking.
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1. Education, Experience, and Training
Despite the common-sense appeal of this approach, an
impressive array of empirical studies has established firmly that the
human capital theory offers but a partial explanation for the gender
wage gap. Indeed, the general consensus is that human capital factors
explain about one-third to one-half of the pay differentials between
men and women-not an insubstantial amount, but far from a
complete explanation either.3 5 Two reasons are typically advanced to
explain the theory's limited explanatory power.
First, women have narrowed the gaps in education and
experience to a far greater extent than is reflected in the wage ratio.36
This fact is particularly true with respect to education, where women
matched men in terms of college attendance rates in the 1980s and
constituted a majority of college students by 1990. 31 Women also
substantially narrowed differences in fields of study, a factor that had
long been thought to account for much of their earnings inequality.38
By 1990, women accounted for 50% of college biology majors and
35. See BLAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 189-90 (finding that education and experience
explain only one-third of the wage gap excluding the occupational component); GOLDIN,
supra note 23, at 114-17 (canvassing studies concluding that human capital theories
explain 44% to 74% of the wage gap); Marini & Fan, supra note 23, at 590 (noting that
"[i]n studies based on samples of individuals of diverse ages, at most about half of the
gender gap in wages is associated with mean differences in human capital between the
sexes-and in some studies it is considerably less"); Paul L. Schumann et al., The Effects of
Human Capital and Job Characteristics on Pay, 29 J. HuM. REsoURCEs 481, 499 (1994)
(finding that human capital and job characteristics together explained 50% of the wage
gap in a surveyed sample).
36. See William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, Cumulative Versus Continuous
Disadvantage in an Unstructured Labor Market, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK 209,
223-25 (Jerry A. Jacobs ed., 1995) (finding a wage gap of 25% for female television writers
after holding human capital factors constant); June O'Neill & Solomon Polachek, Why the
Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s, 11 J. LAB. EcON. 205, 209 (1993)
(concluding that "the narrowing in the gender gap in earnings in the 1980s to a large
extent was caused by a narrowing in the gender gap in experience").
37. See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 59. In 1998, 29% of women aged 25 to 29
had completed college, compared to 26% of men. See JENNIFER C. DAY & ANDREA E.
CURRY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATrANMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 1998, at tbl.3 (1998) (Sup. Docs. No. C 3.186:P-201513). Some of the changes in
women's educational attainment, however, are the result of women's greater attendance at
community colleges and of substantial numbers of older women returning to school, both
of which are likely to offer relatively lower payoffs in the marketplace. See SPAIN &
BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 61.
38. Barry Gerhart has documented the role that college majors play in explaining the
wage gap, although in his study two engineering majors (mechanical and electrical)
accounted for a large portion of the explanation. See Barry Gerhart, Gender Differences
in Current and Starting Salaries: The Role of Performance, College Major, and Job Title,
43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 418,426 (1990).
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46.2% of mathematics majors.3 9 Nevertheless, a survey of 1985
graduates found that even after controlling for major, grades, and
quality of education, recent female college graduates still experienced
a 10% to 15% wage disadvantage compared to similarly situated male
graduates.40
In the last two decades, women likewise have reduced the
disparities in work experience, especially among more recent entrants
to the workforce. For example, in 1998, men aged twenty-five to
thirty-four had a median tenure of 2.8 years with their current
employer, whereas for women in the same age group the median was
2.5 years.4' Indeed, a significant portion of the decline in the wage
gap appears to be attributable to the narrowing of differences in work
experience. 42
39. See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 63. These numbers represent sharp gains
from the 1970s, when women received 27.8% of biology and 37.4% of mathematics
degrees. See id There were also significant improvements at the graduate levels: women
received 51.0% of master's degrees and 35.4% of doctorates in biology, as well as 40.1%
of the master's degrees and 17.8% of the doctorates in mathematics. See id. As the
authors explain: "In 1964, approximately one-half of women college students would have
had to change majors to achieve the distribution of men's majors. By 1984, only one-third
of women would have had to change majors to match men's majors." Id. Despite the
advances noted above, it appears that the trend toward greater integration of majors may
have stalled recently. See Jerry A. Jacobs, Gender and Academic Specialties: Trends
Among Recipients of College Degrees in the 1980s, 68 Soc. OF EDUC. 81, 86 (1995) (noting
that "the trend toward lower levels of segregation across majors that was evident in the
early 1980s slowed or reversed direction in the late 1980s").
40. See Catherine J. Weinberger, Race and Gender Wage Gaps in the Market for
Recent College Graduates, 37 INDUS. REL. 67, 82 (1998) ("The analysis shows clearly that
among recent college graduates, white women[,] ... black women[,] ... and Asian women
all face the same 10 to 15 percent wage disadvantage relative to white men with the same
type and quality of college education."). Although field of study is often thought to a
provide substantial explanation, the primary effect of a college major is to determine the
general industry in which the person is likely to work. Therefore, it is often difficult to
know whether the major is tied to wages or whether the observed wages are a product of
the particular industry. See Charles Brown & Mary Corcoran, Sex-Based Differences in
School Content and the Male-Female Wage Gap, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 431, 460 (1997). In this
way, field of study is closely related to the issue of occupational segregation and choice.
See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
41. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employee Tenure in 1998,
tbl.1 (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.toc.htm>. The
differences were greater with older workers: men aged 45 to 54 had a median tenure of
9.4 years compared to women's median of 7.2 years. See id.; see also Francine D. Blau,
Trends in Well-Being of American Women, 1970-1995, 36 J. ECON. LiT. 112, 119 (1998)
(noting that "among full-time workers, the gender difference in full-time experience
declined from 7.5 years in 1979 to 4.6 years in 1988").
42. See Allison J. Wellington, Changes in the Male/Female Wage Gap, 1976-85, 28 J.
HuM. RESOURCEs 383, 395 (1993) (concluding that changes in women's market
experience explained a significant portion of the reduction in the wage gap). There is also
evidence that early experience in the labor market is only mildly significant to later wages,
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Like education and experience, job training can also enhance a
person's value in the labor market, especially job training that is
general rather than specific to a particular firm or industry. Human
capital theorists often suggest that women are likely to invest less in
job training because such training has a lower value for women given
the likelihood that they may spend significant time out of the labor
market.43 Evidence suggests that women receive less on-the-job
training than men, but the evidence is not overwhelming and is often
difficult to interpret.44  For example, the standard neoclassical
argument that the difference in training reflects women's lower
investments in job training should have little force when the
employers provide the training unless women are opting out of the
training on a voluntary basis or employers are discriminating against
women when making the training opportunities available to their
workers.45 It also has been suggested that the difference in training is
as many young employees explore various jobs in their early careers. See Rosella
Gardecki & David Neumark, Order from Chaos? The Effects of Early Labor Market
Experiences on Adult Labor Market Outcomes, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 299, 318-19
(1998). The importance of early job attachment appears somewhat more important for
women, however, who generally have a greater need than men to signal their workplace
commitment to employers. See id. at 319.
43. See Anne Beeson Royalty, The Effects of Job Turnover on the Training of Men
and Women, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 513, 520 (1996) (finding that job turnover rates
may account for as much as 25% of the training differential). Even these results, however,
leave three-quarters of the training differential unexplained.
44. A 1995 survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, found
that men averaged 48 hours of training during the six months of the survey period, while
women averaged 42 hours. See Harley Frazis et al., Results from the 1995 Survey of
Employer-Provided Training, MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1998, at 3, 10. The report,
however, concluded that this difference was too small to be statistically significant. See id.;
see also Reed Neil Olsen & Edwin A. Sexton, Gender Differences in the Returns to and the
Acquisition of On-the-Job Training, 35 INDUS. REL. 59, 68-70 (1996) (discussing the
impact of training rates on female wages); Jonathan R. Veum, Training Among Young
Adults: Who, What Kind, and for How Long?, MONTHLY LAB. 'REV., Aug. 1993, at 27,
28-30 (discussing lower training rates among women). Other surveys indicate that
women's investments in training are comparable to men's, although the duration of their
training appears to be shorter. See Mark A. Loewenstein & James R. Spletzer, Delayed
Formal On-the-Job Training, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 82,95 n.20 (1997).
45. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR
ECONOMICs 308 (6th ed. 1997) (suggesting that employers might provide less training to
women due to the perception that women are likely to leave the workforce for family
reasons). A study involving Canadian women provides some indirect evidence to refute
the notion that women accumulate less firm-specific human capital than men: in the study,
women tended to suffer greater wage loss following job displacement than men. See
Thomas F. Crossley et al., Gender Differences in Displacement Cost: Evidence and
Implications, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 461,474-77 (1994). This finding is inconsistent with
the human capital story, which suggests that women invest less in training so that they will
not suffer as much of a penalty when they leave a job. Another fact that conflicts with the
human capital explanation is that one would expect women to receive higher wages early
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primarily due to the kinds of jobs women occupy, which tend to offer
fewer training opportunities than the jobs of their male
counterparts.41 As such, it is difficult to know how to interpret the
differential training data, other than perhaps to suggest that it does
not offer a compelling explanation. In fact, after reviewing the
evidence relating to human capital investments, two economists have
concluded that "it is clear that closing the human capital gap between
men and women, with regard to skill acquisition, training, and
particularly work experience ... will not by itself close the gender
wage gap."47
In addition to the limited empirical support that underlie the
human capital explanations, substantial documentation suggests that
human capital factors do not fully explain employers' wage-setting
processes and therefore do not account for significant portions of
wage functions. s Some of the lack of explanatory power is due to the
sheer difficulty of measuring individual productivity, for which
education, experience, and training are generally used as rough
proxies,49 while still other measurement issues arise due to
in their careers when men are devoting more time, and presumably receiving lower wages,
in training. See BLAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 181-83. There is, however, no evidence to
support this notion. See id.
46. See John M. Barron et al., Gender Differences in Training, Capital and Wages, 28
J. HUM. RESOURCES 343, 361 (1993). Interestingly, firm-specific training tends to
improve women's job tenure in their first jobs much more significantly than it does for
men. See Lisa M. Lynch, The Role of Off-the-Job vs. On-the-Job Training for the Mobility
of Women Workers, 81 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 151,155 (1991).
47. Judith Fields & Edward N. Wolff, Interindustry Wage Differentials and the Gender
Wage Gap, 49 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 105, 118-19 (1995). The authors of the study
found that women were concentrated in lower-paying industries and that this distribution
explained about one-third of the wage gap. See id. at 116-18.
48. See, e.g., Barbara Stanek Kilbourne et al., Returns to Skill, Compensating
Differentials, and Gender Bias: Effects of Occupational Characteristics on the Wages of
White Women and Men, 100 AM. J. SOC. 689, 705 (1994) (finding that experience
explained a significant portion of the wage gap, but that education did not); James L.
Medoff & Katherine G. Abraham, Are Those Paid More Really More Productive? The
Case of Experience, 16 J. HUM. RESOURCES 186,215 (1981) (concluding that only "a small
fraction of experience-earnings differentials can be explained by experience-productivity
differentials"); Linda K. Stroh et al., All the Right Stuff. A Comparison of Female and
Male Managers' Career Progression, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 251, 255 (1992) ("Education
was the only human capital variable that predicted salary progression."); Andrew Weiss,
Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1995, at 133,
141 (finding that "test scores[] and measurable learning in secondary school can explain at
most one-quarter of the increased earning associated with high school, and probably
substantially less").
49. For discussions relating to the difficulty of measuring productivity, see generally
EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 45, at 382-83 (discussing the difficulty of measuring
many qualitative aspects of performance); Hae-shin Hwang et al., Compensating Wage
Differentials and Unobserved Productivity, 100 J. POL. ECON. 835, 843 (1992) ("[W]e
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peculiarities of the labor market that are still not well understood."
The few studies that have been able to measure productivity directly
generally have concluded that the wage gap cannot be attributed to
productivity differences between men and women."'
2. The Question of Hours
Education, experience, and training are the characteristics
typically considered in human capital explanations for the pay
differential between men and women. Another possible explanation
for why men are paid more than women, even for similar jobs, may be
tied to men's ability to work longer hours, an ability that may relate
to the fact that women are still largely responsible for child rearing.
This theory suggests that women may not be able to work as many
hours, put in necessary overtime, or pay as much attention at work
due to concerns about their children and that these differences may
then be reflected in lower wages.52 This is a complicated and
controversial issue on which the data are not likely to provide a
convincing explanation because effort levels and employee dedication
are the kind of workplace intangibles that are difficult to quantify
suggest that 30-50 percent of total worker productivity variance remains uncaptured by
the usual set of labor market productivity variables-variables such as age, labor market
experience, and formal schooling.").
50. For example, contrary to what might be expected under neoclassical models,
studies indicate that employers are reluctant to lower wages when faced with slack
demand and instead prefer to lay workers off. Additionally, it often appears that
employers pay more than is necessary to attract qualified employees. For discussions of
these and other issues relating to the particularities of the labor market, see generally
ROBERT M. SOLOW, THE LABOR MARKET AS A SOCIAL INSTITUI~ON (1990); Jeremy I.
Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to
Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 376
(1986); Weiss, supra note 48; Janet L. Yellen, Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment,
74 AM. ECON. REv. 200 (1984). It is also well-established that large employers tend to
pay higher wages than smaller employers. See Walter Y. Oi, Employment Relations in
Dual Labor Markets ("It's Nice Work if You Can Get It"), 8 J. LAB. ECON. S124, S125
(1990) (discussing the effect of employer size on wages).
51. An important recent study found that women were somewhat less productive than
men but that "women's wages fall short of men by considerably more than can be
explained by their lower marginal productivity." Judith K. Hellerstein et al., Wages,
Productivity, and Worker Characteristics: Evidence from Plant-Level Production
Functions and Wage Equations, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 409, 433 (1999) (using data from 1989).
An earlier study that also utilized direct measures of productivity found that women had
"comparable productivity," but "much lower wages" than men. Harry J. Holzer, The
Determinants of Employee Productivity and Earnings, 29 INDus. REL. 403, 415 (1990).
52. See Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1780-82 (1986) (arguing that the difference in hours worked
between men and women provides an explanation for differential wages).
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and, therefore, difficult to assess other than through speculation.53
The available data suggest, however, that the number of hours
worked fails to demonstrate that the pay differentials relate to
productivity differences.
One potential measure of effort or dedication might be hours
worked, based on the notion that the more dedicated employees work
longer hours. This measure is, of course, imperfect because the most
dedicated employees may be the most efficient, thus saving employers
in hourly compensation.' To the extent hours matter, men do spend
more time in the labor market than women, but the differences are
not particularly significant. Recent data from the Current Population
Survey indicate that in 1997 30% of men and 15% of women usually
worked more than forty-four hours in a week, while only one in ten
men and one in thirty women worked more than fifty-four hours a
week.5 Excessive hours were considerably more likely at the
executive and managerial level than in nonsupervisory positions,56
and on average men worked forty-four hours per week while women
worked forty-one hours.57 The wage premium paid for working
extended hours was marginally higher for women than men,58 and the
data also suggest that women have increased their work hours in
recent years more than their male counterparts. 9 Moreover, women
53. For an argument that unobserved characteristics, such as motivation, explain a
substantial portion of the wage gap, see Moon-Kak Kim & Solomon W. Polachek, Panel
Estimates of Male-Female Earnings Functions, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 406, 407-08 (1994).
As noted in the text, however, these characteristics are difficult to measure or model by
their very nature. Thus, it is not easy to assign them any causal role without a substantial
element of speculation.
54. It is not clear that a willingness to work longer hours ought to result in higher
hourly wages, especially when a significant wage gap exists. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. There are, however, a variety of reasons that an employer may be
willing to pay higher hourly wages to those employees who are willing to take on longer
hours, including the perception that these employees are harder workers.
55. See Daniel Hecker, How Hours of Work Affect Occupational Earnings, MONTHLY
LAB. REv., Oct. 1998, at 8,9.
56. At the executive and managerial levels, 50% of men and 30% of women worked
more than 44 hours in a week. See id.
57. See id at 10. It is easy for lawyers, who work unusually long hours, to
overemphasize the importance of long hours, and indeed lawyers have been quick to
suggest to me that a disparity in hours probably offers a significant explanation.
Interestingly, among lawyers, the average hours worked for men and women were roughly
the same, although a larger percentage of men (25% compared to 18% of women) worked
more than 55 hours a week. See icL at 11-12 tbl.2.
58. See id. at 13-16 tbl.3.
59. Relying on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the period 1979 to
1989, Barry Bluestone and Stephen Rose concluded that "[a]s a general rule,... there has
been a slight reduction in men's work hours and a large increase in women's hours."
Barry Bluestone & Stephen Rose, Overworked and Underemployed, AM. PROSPECr,
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generally spend more time than men on combined market and
nonmarket work.' This finding suggests that women may have more
overall effort to expend than men do, so that, even if women have
more duties outside the workplace, there is no particular reason to
believe that women are unable to devote sufficient time or energy to
their jobs.
3. Marriage, Children, and Housework
The above discussion demonstrates that the traditional human
capital story falls short as a means of explaining the persistence of the
wage gap. Although employers generally take education, experience,
and training into account when making hiring decisions and
determining pay scales, they seem to take other factors into account
as well.' Two such factors that appear to be considered by
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 58, 64. Women also constitute the majority of employees who have
taken on second jobs during the last decade. See id. at 59 (noting that the percentage of
the workforce that reported working second jobs rose from 4.9% in 1979 to 6.4% in 1995
and that "[v]irtually all of this increase has occurred among women, who now represent
nearly half of all multiple job holders"). The issues of whether hours are increasing for
workers and of the importance of working longer hours are controversial and hotly
debated. The common perception is that people are working longer hours either to get
ahead or to stay even. See, e.g., JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE
UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991); Louis Uchitelle, At the Desk, off the Clock
and Below Statistical Radar, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1999, at 4. Detailed time-use studies
conducted at the University of Maryland, however, indicate that people are working less
than they once did and actually have more free time than they generally believe. See
JOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS
AMERICANS USE THEIR TIME 78-80 (1997). As a result, probably all that we can say is
that the data compiled by the government indicate that hours have remained stable during
the last decade, and there is as yet no conclusive evidence that men are working more than
women at a rate that might explain the pay gap.
60. See, e.g., FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED
PARENTING WORKS 6 (1999) (noting that, in three-fourths of the families interviewed in
which the husband engaged in more paid labor than the wife, the wife actually worked
more hours "when paid work and household work were considered together"); Joni
Hersch, Economics of Housework, in WOMEN AND WORK: A HANDBOOK 83, 85 (Paula
J. Dubeck & Kathryn Borman eds., 1996) ("Although men average more hours than
women in paid employment, full-time employed women spend more total time on
housework and market work than do men."). A study of dual-earner families based on a
1986-1987 national sample found that women worked a total of 68.8 hours a week
compared to 63.4 hours for men. See Harriet B. Presser, Employment Schedules Among
Dual-Earner Spouses and the Division of Household Labor by Gender, 59 AM. Soc. REV.
348, 353 (1994). These figures did not include child care and therefore almost certainly
underestimate of women's hours. See id.
61. It is also worth noting that employers occasionally set policies with little concern
for their rationality. For example, a study of a large insurance company found that
receiving an outstanding performance rating actually had a negative effect on promotion.
See Heidi I. Hartmann, Internal Labor Markets and Gender: A Case Study of Promotion,
in GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE 59, 80 (Clair Brown & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1987).
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employers, and valued differentially for men and women, are
marriage and children. As has been well documented, for men,
marriage is typically rewarded with a wage premium, while for
women, marriage has either a neutral or modestly negative effect on
their wages.62 Having children, on the other hand, is generally a
negative factor in the labor market for women, though neutral for
men. In her review of the data, Jane Waldfogel reported that "[e]ven
after controlling for differences in characteristics such as education
and work experience, researchers typically find a family penalty of
10-15 percent for women with children as compared to women
without children."'
These factors-marriage and children-might be related to an
employee's productivity, as the difference being married makes to
wages could be explained by the contributions a marriage might offer
toward the wage earning potential of men and women. Indeed, a
number of commentators have suggested that marriage makes men
more productive in the workplace, although even among those who
Similarly, in invalidating a program that denied women their accrued seniority while on
leave, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist, noted that the
policy at issue appeared economically unwise in that "inexperienced employees are
favored over experienced employees." Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 n.5
(1977).
62. See, e.g., Marcia L. Bellas, The Effects of Marital Status and Wives' Employment
on the Salaries of Faculty Men: The (House)Wife Bonus, 6 GENDER & Soc'Y 609, 612-18
(1992) (discussing marital bonuses for male faculty members); Joni Hersch, Male-Female
Differences in Hourly Wages: The Role of Human Capital, Working Conditions, and
Housework, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 746,752 (1991) ("Consistent with other studies,
being married is positively related to men's earnings and not significant for women.");
Martha S. Hill, The Wage Effects of Marital Status and Children, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES
579, 592 (1979) ("[Tihe data ... indicate ... a strong positive wage effect of marriage
among men, an effect that is independent of numerous controls for worker
qualifications."); Jerry A. Jacobs, Women's Entry into Management: Trends in Earnings,
Authority, and Values Among Salaried Managers, 37 ADMIN. SC. Q. 282, 296 (1992)
(finding that marital status had a negative effect on the wages of female managers, but a
positive effect for male managers); Eng Seng Loh, Productivity Differences and the
Marriage Wage Premium for White Males, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 566, 567-71 (1996)
(surveying literature on the male wage premium). One recent study suggests that the male
wage premium declined significantly in the 1980s. See Jeffrey S. Gray, The Fall in Men's
Return to Marriage: Declining Productivity Effects or Changing Selection?, 32 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 481, 491 (1997) (finding evidence that "the return to marriage for men fell by
45 percent over the 1980s").
63. Waldfogel, supra note 7, at 143. In contrast, Waldfogel noted that married men,
including those with children, tend to earn more than single men. See id.; see also Jo
Dixon & Carroll Seron, Stratification in the Legal Profession: Sex, Sector, and Salary, 29 L.
& SOC'Y REV. 381, 392 (1995) (finding that for male New York lawyers being a parent
increased income); Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Marriage, Motherhood, and
Wages, 27 J. HUM. RESOURCES 233, 251-54 (1992) (finding that marriage did not affect
wage rates for women but that the presence of children did).
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adopt this position it is often unclear exactly how marriage might
increase productivity.' 4 One explanation suggests that after marrying,
men tend to settle down and become more serious about their work
life or to devote less time to housework, changes that may increase
their productivity in the workplace. It is also possible that marriage
may be seen as a proxy for some other desirable characteristic among
men, such as loyalty or commitment.'
Even a cursory evaluation exposes the flaws in these arguments.
The idea that marriage is a helpful proxy for labor market success
ignores the high number of marriages that fail, and it would surely be
fanciful to think that employers can foresee which marriages are most
likely to last. If employers in fact could determine the characteristics
that lead to successful marriages, they would use those characteristics
rather than marriage as a proxy for employee productivity.
Conceivably, the simple fact of marriage, not the success of that
marriage, provides an important signal regarding future labor market
success, but if this were so, "marriage" would then be a proxy for
some productivity component, and it is difficult to understand exactly
how the act of marrying in and of itself provides significant evidence
to an employer, particularly independent of the success of that
marriage. On the contrary, several recent studies suggest that in
many ways, marriage may lead to lower productivity for men.66 For
example, married self-employed men earn less than single self-
employed men, and married men actually perform slightly more
64. See Lawrence W. Kenny, The Accumulation of Human Capital During Marriage
by Males, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 223, 230 (1983) (suggesting that marriage contributes to
men's human capital); Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make
Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282, 303-04 (1991) (suggesting that
marriage increases productivity for men).
65. This explanation also may apply to women, and one recent study found a marriage
wage premium related to productivity differences for both men and women. See
Hellerstein et al., supra note 51, at 443 ("Workers who have ever been married are paid
more than never-married workers, and the wage premium they receive reflects a
corresponding productivity premium."). It is also possible that the desirable male workers
are marrying women who are more likely to help out at home than to devote themselves
to the workforce, but this possibility is an empirical question on which I have seen no data.
Given that highly educated men tend to marry highly educated women, this conclusion
appears unlikely. See JERRY A. JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND
WOMEN'S CAREERS 44 (1989) ("[O]n average, highly educated men marry women who
themselves are well educated.").
66. See Loh, supra note 62, at 571-72 (demonstrating that the wage premium is not
reflected among self-employed men); see also McKinley Blackburn & Sanders Korenman,
The Declining Marital-Status Earnings Differential, 7 J. POPULATION ECON. 247, 249
(1994) (documenting a decrease in returns to marriage as the number of years married
increases); Gray, supra note 62, at 491-95 (finding that marriage decreases productivity for
men).
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housework than single men.67
Nevertheless, while the rationale may not be fully understood or
supported by the data, marriage clearly is treated as a positive factor
for men in the workplace, whereas for women it proves considerably
more ambiguous and is more likely than not seen as a negative
attribute.68 As discussed in more detail in Section B, the reason
marriage often carries negative connotations for women has to do
with an employer's expectation that, following marriage, women are
likely to leave the workforce for some period of time to have and to
care for children. Indeed, as noted, the presence of children also
produces disparate effects on the salaries of men and women,
depressing those for women while generally not affecting them for
men.69 Here, the salary differentials seem to be based largely, though
not entirely, on the actual experiences of men and women, at least
with respect to group averages, as women tend to experience greater
absences from work than men when they have young children.70 One
recent study estimated that for women each additional child under six
years of age increased the probability of absence from work by more
than 25% percent, although the actual amount of time lost at work
remained relatively low. 1 In contrast, having children at home tends
67. See Bird, supra note 4, at 37-38; David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family
Diversity and the Division of Domestic Labor, 42 FAM. REL. 323, 330 (1993).
68. There is some evidence that marriage is treated more positively for black women
than for white women. See Barbara Kilbourne et al., Effects of Individual, Occupational,
and Industrial Characteristics on Earnings: Intersections of Race and Gender, 72 Soc.
FORCES 1149, 1165 (1994) ("In contrast to the nonsignificant effect of marital status for
white women ... black women's earnings significantly increase by about 3% upon
marriage."). The wage premium that black women receive upon marriage, however, falls
far short of that received by black and white men. See id. (finding a wage premium of 13%
for white men and 9% for black men).
69. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
70. It is important to emphasize that the wage differentials do not appear to be fully
explained by characteristics that are relevant to the workplace. Jane Waldfogel's recent
comprehensive study on the effect of children on women's wages concluded: "Even after
controlling for human capital, unobserved heterogeneity, and part-time job status ....
there is still a 4 percent penalty for having one child and nearly a 12 percent penalty for
having two or more children." Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's
Wages, 62 AM. Soc. REV. 209,215 (1997).
71. See Jessica Primoff Vistnes, Gender Differences in Days Lost from Work Due to
Illness, 50 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 304, 319 (1997); see also J. Paul Leigh, Sex
Differences in Absenteeism, 22 INDus. REL. 349,360 (1983) (reporting that the presence of
children under six increased absences for women, but not for men). Recent data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that women aged 16 and over missed work at a rate
that was nearly twice as high as men, though they missed less than 3.0% of their work time
on average. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and
Earnings, Jan. 1998, at 219 tbl.44 (Sup. Does. No. L 2.41/2:4511) (reporting that women
had a lost worktime rate of 2.8% compared to the male rate of 1.5%). The Bureau of
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not to affect men's absences7
Likewise, time spent on housework significantly depresses wages.
Professors Joni Hersch and Leslie Stratton recently documented that,
for women, time spent on housework has a strong negative effect on
wages and may explain as much as 10% of the gender wage gap. 3
Though less substantial, the effect of time spent on housework on
men's wages was likewise statistically significant.74 Interestingly, the
authors found no significant effect on the wages of women who
performed ten hours or less of housework a week, an amount that is
generally on par with the level of most men.75 Not surprisingly,
women in the study did approximately three times as much
housework as men, an estimate that is generally consistent with most
previous studies. 76 The disparities in housework persist even in dual-
earner couples, as working women still perform approximately twice
as much housework as their spouses.77 Thus, it seems clear that
Labor Statistics measured lost work for the following reasons: own illness, injury, or
medical problems; maternity or paternity leave; child care problems; civic or military duty;
and other family or personal obligations. See id. at n.1.
72. See Vistnes, supra note 71, at 314. The number of missed days from work for men
with children in day care did increase by a statistically significant amount, which was
presumably a sign that those men's wives worked and were less able to devote time to
caring for the children. See id. at 318.
73. See Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework, Fixed Effects and Wages of
Married Women, 32 J. HUM. REsouRcEs 285, 300-01 (1997). This study was based on a
sample of more than 3500 individuals over a period ranging from 1979 to 1987. See id. at
288-90.
74. See id. at 301. The authors were puzzled by the gender-specific wage penalty for
housework and suggested that the disparity may be a sign that employers discriminate
against women, but not men who devote substantial time to housework. See id. at 304.
This observation supports the role of statistical discrimination discussed more fully infra at
notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
75. See Hersch & Stratton, supra note 73, at 294.
76. See id. at 289-90. In the sample, women averaged 19.2 hours of housework a week
while men averaged 6.8 hours. See id. In contrast to these figures, Kathleen Hall
Jamieson cites numerous studies indicating that men perform on average about 20% of
household tasks and devote on average less than one-third the time to caring for their
children than their spouses. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, BEYOND THE DOUBLE
BIND 62 (1995); see also Demo & Acock, supra note 67, at 329 (finding that mothers spend
between 40-44 hours per week on household labor, while husbands or partners spent on
average 13). For a discussion of the studies on housework, see Katharine Silbaugh,
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1996).
There is some evidence that the gap in hours is decreasing, primarily as a result of women
decreasing the number of hours they devote to housework. See Blau, supra note 41, at
151. The disparities also vary some by race, as black men tend to have more egalitarian
views regarding gender norms and housework. See Terri L. Orbuch & Sandra L. Eyster,
Division of Household Labor Among Black Couples and White Couples, 76 Soc. FORCES
301,325 (1997).
77. See Sampson Lee Blair & Michael P. Johnson, Wives' Perceptions of the Fairness
of the Division of Household Labor: The Intersection of Housework and Ideology, 54 J.
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marriage and children negatively affect women's wages and career
paths and help explain the persistence of the wage gap.
4. Women's Labor Force Attachment
As just noted, the greater time that women spend on their
children and on housework explains a portion of the gender wage
gap. Yet, just as was true with the traditional human capital factors,
the observed differences do not fully explain the gap, and something
else appears to be responsible for the persistence of gender labor
market inequalities. That missing factor, which may also be implicit
in the marriage and child penalties, is generally thought to be
women's labor force attachment. In particular, women's supposed
tendency to exit the labor market for periods of time to have and to
care for children, as well as their choices about careers, are said to
explain generally why women often end up in different jobs than men
or are paid significantly less than their male counterparts in the same
occupation. For example, given their disproportionate responsibility
for child rearing, women may choose jobs that offer greater flexibility
or that require comparatively less work effort. 8 Similarly, women
may be trading lower wages for higher workplace benefits because
they may have more to gain from generous health insurance or leave
policies. 9
Again, like the closely related human capital theory, these ideas
offer more intuitive than explanatory power. A number of recent
studies have demonstrated that women do not appear to be choosing
jobs or occupations that necessarily facilitate more flexible work
schedules." If this theory were true-if, for example, women were
MARRIAGE & FAM. 570, 575 (1992) (finding that nonemployed wives performed four
times as much housework as their employed spouses, while employed women did twice as
much housework); Presser, supra note 60, at 353 (finding that women in a sample of dual-
earner families worked twice as many hours in the home as men).
78. See BECKER, supra note 31, at 74; Gary Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of
Time, 75 ECON. J. 493, 517 (1965). Becker sets forth his argument succinctly in Gary S.
Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 533
(1985). For additional discussions along these lines, see Polachek, supra note 26, at 68
(suggesting that women's labor force attachment accounts for occupational differences);
Posner, supra note 26, at 1330 (assuming that women are attracted to jobs requiring less
human capital).
79. See, e.g., Randall K. Filer, Male-Female Wage Differences: The Importance of
Compensating Differentials, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 426, 427 (1985) (hypothesizing
that women trade benefits for other desirable workplace characteristics); Weiler, supra
note 52, at 1782-83 (arguing that working conditions can help explain the wage gap).
80. See, e.g., Sonalde Desai & Linda J. Waite, Women's Employment During
Pregnancy and After the First Birth: Occupational Characteristics and Work Commitment,
56 AM. Soc. REv. 551, 563 (1991) ("[W]e find no effect of the sex composition of the
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choosing jobs that facilitated child rearing-one would expect to find
women concentrated in occupations that require less effort or for
which on-the-job training is comparatively less important, both of
which would allow women to spend more time on their home life and
make it somewhat less costly for them to move in and out of the
workforce. However, based on his exhaustive analysis of data from
North Carolina, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey recently concluded that
"[i]t is striking that neither being married and having young children
nor working part-time affects whether women or men choose sex-
segregated employment."" Mary Becker likewise observed some
years ago that "[w]omen with less continuous employment experience
are about as likely to be in male fields as women with more
continuous employment experience, and the depreciation rates [for
skills] associated with temporary withdrawal from the wage-labor
market are not significantly higher for male jobs than for female
jobs."' ' 2
Similarly, women tend to rank income as high in importance
among job characteristics as men do,8 and the current data do not
support the theory that women are trading lower wages for higher
benefits" As a group, women hold jobs that offer less generous
occupation, which could ... signify that the sex composition of the occupation has no
influence on the employment of pregnant women and new mothers.").
81. DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK 50
(1993).
82. Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need
for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 934, 934-35
(1986); see also Paula England, The Failure of Human Capital Theory to Explain
Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 358, 369 (1982) (documenting that
"women with more continuous employment histories are no less apt than other women to
be in predominantly female occupations").
83. See Jerry A. Jacobs & Ronnie Steinberg, Further Evidence on Compensating
Differentials and the Gender Gap in Wages, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK, supra
note 36, at 93, 102 ("Survey data suggest that working women rank income as high as men
do on a list of factors for choosing a job."); Margaret Mooney Marini et al., Gender and
Job Values, 69 SOC. OF EDUc. 49, 62-63 (1996) (finding that young men and women
valued rewards of work similarly). A study involving business majors at the University of
Illinois found that although men and women both valued salary highly, men placed more
weight on salary, while for women career advancement was slightly more important. See
Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Career Plans and Expectations of Young Women
and Men: The Earnings Gap and Labor Force Participation, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 581,
590 (1991) ("The same three characteristics are rated highest by both groups[:] ... salary,
opportunity for advancement, and intellectual challenge, though men do opt more often
for the first two, women for the third.").
84. See TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 81, at 51 ("Women are not selecting
typically female jobs to trade higher starting wages for lower wage depreciation when they
leave the labor force to have and care for children."); Sarah Beth Estes & Jennifer L.
Glass, Job Changes Following Childbirth: Are Women Trading Compensation for Family-
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benefits than those held by men." Nor does it appear that the wage
gap can be explained by the fact that women choose less strenuous or
dangerous jobs or that they demonstrate a preference for easier
jobs.86 Although women tend to work in jobs that have better safety
records than jobs held by men, increasingly the data demonstrate that
there is no wage premium for dangerous or undesirable jobs.87
Although some of these findings may seem counterintuitive, they
appear more sensible when we look closely at women's actual labor
force behavior, which tends to be far more consistent than is often
assumed. For women, the most common reason to leave the
Responsive Work Conditions?, 23 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 405, 424 (1996) ("[T]he
quantitative analysis yields little evidence that accommodations are being substituted for
compensation in the job mobility of new mothers."); Hersch, supra note 62, at 757
(rejecting the theory that women are choosing lower-paying jobs on the basis of
compensating factors because, "[i]f women choose lower-paying jobs because such jobs
provide non-wage compensation, such as pleasant working conditions, we would expect to
explain more of the wage gap by controlling for attributes of jobs"); Joni Hersch & Shelley
White-Means, Employer-Sponsored Health and Pension Benefits and the Gender/Race
Wage Gap, 74 Soc. SCI. Q. 851, 864-65 (1993) (finding that increased benefits do not
explain the gender wage gap as women "still face a large compensation disadvantage
relative to white men").
85. See JOYCE P. JACOBSEN, THE ECONOMICS OF GENDER 50 (2d ed. 1998) ("It is
clear from surveys that women generally have fewer fringe benefits ... available to them
in terms of total monetary value, partly because more women work part-time and partly
because the value of some fringe benefits is directly tied to earnings."); William E. Even &
David A. Macpherson, Gender Differences in Pensions, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 555, 555-
56 (1994) ("In the United States, 55 percent of male employees were enrolled in a private
pension plan in 1988, while only 45 percent of female employees were."); Christine A.
Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15,
24-25 (1991) (discussing the disparity of benefits between men and women).
86. A comprehensive study involving New York state data found that although men
worked in jobs with more extreme working conditions, those conditions did not explain
the gender wage gap. See Jacobs & Steinberg, supra note 83, at 113-14. In fact the
opposite was true as "workers suffer a wage penalty for working in unattractive jobs." Id.;
see also Kilbourne et al., supra note 48, at 708 (finding "little support" for the notion that
the wage gap can be explained by the fact that men hold less desirable or more dangerous
jobs and positing "gender bias in wage setting that devalues female occupations" as a
contributing factor).
87. Two facts illustrate this point: union members receive higher wages and
experience lower fatality rates than nonunion members, and wages tend to increase with
education, while injury rates decrease. For a comprehensive recent discussion of the issue,
see generally Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work
Revisited, 52 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 116 (1998). One of the complexities of measuring
wage premiums for dangerous work is that it is extremely difficult to capture the full costs
that employees face, including the psychic costs such as pain and suffering that they may
experience by working in dangerous jobs. See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 19 (1993). Because of this difficulty, studies tend to
underestimate the costs of the jobs and, therefore, to overstate the extent that wages may
compensate employees for dangerous work conditions.
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workforce is to have a child.' Yet, following childbirth, the majority
of women return to work within six months, and between 40% and
65% return within three months. 9 After reviewing the data from the
1990 Child Care Survey, Sandra Hofferth found that 83% of those
mothers who worked during pregnancy returned to work within one
yearf0 In general, most women return to work in some fashion-as of
1992, nearly 80% of women with school-age children were working.91
Even women with very young children have high participation rates;
more than 60% of women with children under two are working. 2
The figures discussed above include women working part-time, a
category that is typically defined as those working fewer than thirty-
five hours per week.93 Approximately one-quarter of working women
with children work part-time,94 and the numbers tend to be lower for
women without children.95 Perhaps more significantly, those who
88. See Joyce P. Jacobsen & Laurence M. Levin, Effects of Intermittent Labor Force
Attachment on Women's Earnings, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1995, at 14,16 (noting that
85% of sampled women who left the labor force did so for family reasons); Audrey Light
& Manuelita Ureta, Early-Career Work Experience and Gender Wage Differentials, 13 J.
LAB. ECON. 121, 142 (1995) (pointing out that the largest group of women left for
personal reasons).
89. See Desai & Waite, supra note 80, at 558 ("About 43% of the new mothers in our
sample had returned to work within three months of the birth of their first child, and 69%
had returned to work within 12 months."); Jutta M. Joesch, Children and the Timing of
Women's Paid Work After Childbirth. A Further Specification of the Relationship, 56 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 429,437 (1994) (finding that of the women surveyed 20% were out of
work for one month or less and 53% returned within six months); Jacob Alex Klerman &
Arleen Leibowitz, The Work-Employment Distinction Among New Mothers, 29 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 277, 296 (1994) ("Today, about half of all women are back at work by the
time their child is four months old.").
90. See Sandra L. Hofferth, Effects of Public and Private Policies on Working After
Childbirth, 23 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 378,388 (1996).
91. These figures are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and are reported in Howard
V. Hayghe & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Married Mothers' Work Patterns: The Job-Family
Compromise, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1994, at 24, 25 (reporting that 78% of women
with school-age children were working in 1992).
92. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Characteristics
of Families tbl.6 (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http:lwww.bls.gov/news.release/famee.toc.htm>.
By all accounts, women as a group have greatly increased their attachment to the labor
force. Kathryn Shaw, for example, notes that the percentage of female workers defined as
having a persistent labor force attachment nearly doubled between the 1970s and the late
1980s. See Kathryn Shaw, The Persistence of Female Labor Supply, 29 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 348, 360 (1994).
93. For a discussion of part-time work as it affects women, see generally Ann
Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for Women Workers, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 799 (1995).
94. In 1998, 26.2% of women with children who worked were working part-time, as
measured by fewer than 35 hours per week. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra
note 2, at tbl.5.
95. For example, in 1997 62.2% of single women without children worked full-time
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worked full-time prior to having a child tended to return to full-time
work after their leave; indeed, it appears relatively rare that women
(or men) move from full- to part-time work. In a recent
comprehensive survey of full-time and part-time workers, Rebecca
Blank found that 86% of women who worked full-time in one year
worked full-time the following year.96 Part-time workers were less
stable, as 20% moved to full-time work and 14% left the labor force
altogether.97 These figures suggest that it is far more common for
women to move from part-time to full-time work than vice versa and
that past labor market experience is critically important to
determining current labor market location. 8 In other words, women
with a continuous labor force attachment prior to childbirth tend to
return to that pattern within six months of the birth of the child.99
Even though women tend to return to work more quickly than is
generally assumed, the timing of their workforce disruption can play
an important role on their wages. As the authors of a recent study on
leave patterns explain, "The general pattern ... is that the gender
wage gap increases with experience over the first 10 years or so of the
compared to 49.6% of single women with children. See Linda J. Waite & Mark R.
Nielsen, The Rise of the Dual-Career Family: 1963-1997, at 16 tbl.2 (Sloan Working
Families Ctr. at the Univ. of Chi. Working Paper No. 99-01, 1999). Approximately 54% of
married women without children worked full-time compared to 42.2% of married women
with children. See id. A survey of young workers based on 1993 data found that 16% of
female workers, and 4% of male workers worked fewer than 35 hours a week. See
Marianne A. Ferber & Jane Waldfogel, The Long-Term Consequences of Nontraditional
Employment, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1998, at 3, 5. Blau and her co-authors, however,
suggest that as many as 27% of employed women worked less than 35 hours per week in
1995. See BLAU ETAL., supra note 20, at 319.
96. See Rebecca M. Blank, Labor Market Dynamics and Part-Time Work, in 17
RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS 57, 65 (Solomon W. Polachek ed., 1998). Blank's
study, one of the most comprehensive to date on part-time work, analyzed 14 years of data
for men and women employed between 1976 and 1989.
97. See id. at 66.
98. See id at 88 (noting that "past labor market histories are very important in
predicting future labor market choices" for adult women). It appears that part-time work
experience provides little predictability, however, because part-time work can be a
transitional stage to full-time work or to leaving the labor market. See id. at 89.
99. See GOLDN, supra note 23, at 32 ("Women who are in the labor force tend to
remain in for long periods of time, while those out of the labor force tend to remain out.");
Hofferth, supra note 90, at 391 ("Working during pregnancy is highly related to working
soon after birth."); Joesch, supra note 89, at 436 (finding that the strongest indicator of
future work is salary prior to birth); David Shapiro & Frank L. Mott, Long-Term
Employment and Earnings of Women in Relation to Employment Behavior Surrounding
the First Birth, 29 J. HuM. RESOURCES, 248, 272 (1994) ("This paper has shown that
among the [sample] women, employment behavior surrounding the first birth tends to be a
significant independent predictor of lifetime work experience.").
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career and then narrows appreciably."' Women who are able to
delay childbirth for the first part of their careers are likely to be
sufficiently well established so as not to pay such a high penalty when
they do have children; however, that delay may increase the chances
of not having children at all and reflects one of the many
disadvantages women continue to face in the workplace.
Yet, based on the data reviewed above, it would be a mistake for
an employer to assume that women are likely to exit the labor force
for significant periods of time after they have a child, where
significant is defined as more than three to six months. 10' At the same
time, it is true that the patterns for women differ significantly from
those of men, and employers may be taking these differences into
account in their employment decisions. These differences, moreover,
likely contribute to (but do not fully explain) the persistence of the
wage gap.' °2 For example, two-thirds of those who work part-time are
women, 1 3 and for men, the most common reason for leaving work for
a sustained period of time tends to be to return to school, while for
women the most common reason has been "personal," a term that
includes leaving the workforce to have children."°4
100. Light & Ureta, supra note 88, at 142. There are obviously exceptions to this
general pattern. For example, a study of lawyers found that among men and women who
graduated from the same law school at the same time women earned about 7% less than
men initially, but after 15 years they earned 40% less. See Robert G. Wood et al., Pay
Differences Among the Highly Paid: The Male-Female Earnings Gap in Lawyers' Salaries,
11 J. LAB. ECON. 417,422-23 (1993).
101. This finding is particularly true among more recent entrants into the workforce.
Based on a comprehensive analysis of longitudinal surveys, two economists have
concluded: "Assuming that the trends revealed here have been sustained, we can
conclude that employers would be completely unjustified in statistically discriminating
against young women because of a belief that they are more prone to job separation than
their male counterparts." Audrey Light & Manuelita Ureta, Panel Estimates of Male and
Female Job Turnover Behavior: Can Female Nonquitters Be Identified?, 10 J. LAB. ECON.
156, 179 (1992).
102. See GOLDIN, supra note 23, at 213 ("As long as women bear a disproportionate
burden in raising children, the labor market will reflect these differences.").
103. See Blank, supra note 96, at 58 and fig. 2; Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1,
at 175, tbl.8 (reporting that women constitute 67.7% of part-time workers).
104. See Light & Ureta, supra note 88, at 128-29 (reporting that 42% of men who left
the workforce explained that they did so to return to school, while 37% of women
indicated that they left for personal reasons). One study found that women were
considerably more likely than men to change jobs for family related reasons. See Kristen
Keith & Abagail McWilliams, The Returns to Mobility and Job Search by Gender, 52
INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 460,465 (1999) (finding that approximately 8.4% of women in
the sample quit their jobs for family related reasons compared to 3.8% of men). There
are, however, studies suggesting vastly different explanations for why women quit their
jobs. For example, Joyce Jacobsen discusses a survey which found that 73% of the women
surveyed quit to work for other companies, and only 7% quit to care for their children
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The more difficult question, one I discuss below, is whether these
group averages provide a reasonable basis for an employer's
decisions, particularly when we consider that the women who are
penalized the most by the use of group averages are those women
who do not follow the expected pattern-either those women who
return to work earlier than expected or those who do not have
children but are nevertheless disadvantaged because it is presumed
that at some point in their careers they will.105 It may also be the case
that women are simply choosing different jobs based on their own
preferences, which may differ from men's, an issue discussed in the
next Section.
B. The Issue of Choice
As just discussed, the human capital theory explains a portion of
the wage gap, which means that women still trail men to some degree
in their investments in education, work experience, and training. We
also saw that women tend to work fewer hours and miss more work
than men, both of which likely contribute to lower wages, though
neither factor adequately explains the wage inequality that women
face. 6 In addition to these facts, the most marked characteristic of
the labor market is the extreme sex segregation across occupations
and jobs, a fact that likewise appears to explain a significant portion
of the pay gap, although how much, and how the data ought to be
interpreted, remain hotly contested issues.'0
full-time. See JACOBSEN, supra note 85, at 135. Moreover, a woman's decision to leave
the workforce when she has children is strongly influenced by both gender norms and the
effect of discrimination on opportunities and work experiences. See infra Part I.B.
105. A study tracing managers who had been relocated as part of promotional
opportunities found that wage differentials persisted even when the male and female
managers were situated nearly identically. The authors concluded:
[W]ith a sample such as the present one, it is legitimate to question why there
should be any sex differences in career progression at all. The female managers
in this study had followed the traditional male model of career advancement.
They had achieved high levels of education and had stayed in the work force.
Many of them were less encumbered by family than were the men. Those with
families were often the primary wage earners, had relocated their families for
their careers, and had not withdrawn from opportunities to relocate. Yet, doing
all this had not been enough. Following the traditional male career model had
not entirely eliminated the discrimination against them.
Stroh et al., supra note 48, at 257; see also infra notes 132-34 (discussing statistical
discrimination).
106. It is also worth noting that there is no indication that the lost work time, which
totals less than 3% of hours worked, is significant enough to adversely affect workers'
productivity to the extent employers might be warranted in taking it into account. See
supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., BLAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 196 (noting that occupational categories
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Based on a common index of segregation, as of 1990, about half
of the women in the labor force would have to switch occupations to
achieve equal representation among occupations. 0 8  Focusing on
occupations, however, likely understates the prevailing level of
segregation because there is strong evidence that segregation is even
more extreme at the job, rather than occupation, level, and it is still
relatively rare for men and women to work in gender-integrated
jobs.0 9 It also has been widely documented that female-dominated
jobs pay substantially less than those occupied principally by men,110
account for about 8% of the pay gap, with more detailed occupational categories raising
the level to 14% to 23%); William J. Carrington & Kenneth R. Troske, Gender
Segregation in Small Firms, 30 J. HUM. RESOURCES 503, 523 (1995) (finding significant
gender segregation across small firms); Michael P. Kidd & Michael Shannon, Does the
Level of Occupational Aggregation Affect Estimates of the Gender Wage Gap?, 49 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REv. 317, 326 (1996) (finding that calculations based on broad occupational
categories underestimate the gender wage differential); Trond Peterson & Laurie A.
Morgan, Separate and Unequa" Occupation-Establishment Sex Segregation and the
Gender Wage Gap, 101 AM. J. Soc. 329, 344-45 (1995) (finding, based on data from the
1970s and early 1980s, that occupational segregation explains more than 80% of the wage
gap).
108. See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 94; Blau, supra note 41, at 132 (finding
that 53% of women would have had to switch jobs in 1990); Cotter et al., supra note 22, at
445 (stating that "over half of women would have to change their jobs before their
occupational distribution would match men's").
109. See Erica L. Groshen, The Structure of the Female/Male Wage Differential: Is It
Who You Are, What You Do, or Where You Work?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 457, 462
(1991) (noting that working in an integrated job is far more unusual than working in an
integrated occupation); Paul L. Schumann et al., The Effects of Human Capital and Job
Characteristics on Pay, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES. 481, 498 (1994) (finding that women were
assigned to lower-graded jobs than men and that gender played a significant role in
assignments); Donald Tomaksovic-Devey, Sex Composition and Gendered Earnings
Inequality, in GENDER INEQUALrrY AT WORK, supra note 36, at 23, 38 (concluding that
job segregation by gender explains twice as much of the wage gap than does occupational
segregation). Segregation at the job level can be seen on law faculties where there exists a
high degree of sex segregation in teaching assignments. See Deborah Jones Merritt &
Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in
Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 267 (1997) (noting that "[m]en and women
teach on the same law faculties today, but they are often hired to teach different courses").
110. See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 123 (noting that "[o]n average... female-
dominated occupations pay less well than male-dominated ones"); Blau, supra note 41, at
127 ("Considerable research suggests that predominantly female occupations pay less,
even controlling for measured personal characteristics of workers and a variety of
characteristics of occupations and industries."); Paula England et al., The Effect of the Sex
Composition of Jobs on Starting Wages in an Organization: Findings from the NLSY, 33
DEMOGRAPHY 511, 520 (1996) ("These findings add to the cumulating evidence that
those who work in female-dominated jobs pay a wage penalty-that employers assign
them lower wages than if the job had a larger proportion of men working in it."); Fields &
Wolff, supra note 47, at 118 (finding that women's concentration in lower-paying
industries explains about one-third of the wage gap). A recent study seeking to determine
whether there were differences between black and white women in the structure of gender
20001
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and as discussed in more detail below, women take longer leave at the
birth of their children than do men and suffer financially because of
their leaves."' As such, the data indicate that men and women tend
to perform different jobs both in and out of the workplace.
Given these facts, a question naturally arises as to how we should
interpret this part of the story. On the one hand, the observed
differences between men and women might be viewed as the product
of social forces, including discrimination, that limit the opportunities
of women in a number of complicated ways. Alternatively, the results
might be explained as the product of personal choices, a view that is
common within economic models"2 and increasingly common among
some female legal scholars." 3 Within this perspective, the fact that
women occupy different jobs is due primarily to personal preferences
and, therefore, is generally not considered a cause for societal
concern. In my judgment, this view offers a highly problematic way
of looking at the world, one that is far too simplistic to capture the
complexities and nuances of choice and preference, complexities that
confound easy attribution and that all too many economic models fail
to acknowledge." 4 Thus, I will argue that it is highly naive to treat the
equality found no clear pattern. See Barbara Kilbourne at al., Effects of Individual,
Occupational and Industrial Characteristics on Earnings: Intersections of Race and
Gender, 72 Soc. FORCES 1149 (1994). Black and white women both suffered similar sharp
wage penalties when the occupation was dominated by women, but black women received
a small wage premium for being married, while white women did not. See id. at 1159,
1165.
111. The issue of leave is discussed infra Part I.D.
112. See supra notes 78-79.
113. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L REV. 761,
768-70 (1990) (critiquing what the author defines as ideological determination
arguments); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994)
(criticizing the premise behind the battered woman syndrome defense, namely that
women lack the psychological capacity to make rational choices); Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin,
and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1123-34
(1994) (arguing that the feminist treatment of all women as sexual victims denies women
the capacity to choose and control their own sexual encounters); Nadine Strossen, The
Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No
Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 725-26 (1995) (arguing that the sexual harassment
doctrine relating to sexual expression resurrects traditional stereotypes and can
disempower women).
114. Susan Moller Okin characterizes the matter this way:
The basic problem with the human capital approach is that, like much of
neoclassical economic theory, it pays too little attention to the multiple
constraints placed on people's choices. It pays too little attention to differentials
of power between the sexes both in the workplace and in the family. It thus
ignores the fact that women's commitment and attachment to the workplace are
strongly influenced by a number of factors that are largely beyond their control.
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 148 (1989).
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labor market as an unadulterated product of rational utility
maximizing, at least in a manner that ought to be seen as
unproblematic.
Economic models typically consider observed labor market
characteristics as resulting from individual preferences-preferences
that are treated as exogenous. 115 While the data provide only modest
support for the notion that the existing conditions are the product of
preferences at all, the underlying assumption of autonomous
preferences has been severely criticized from many different
perspectives. One analytical problem with the emphasis on
preferences is that it is difficult to know whether women's
occupational choices, or their human capital investments, are
products of actual preferences or responses to labor market
opportunities-what has been aptly labeled the "chicken-or-egg"
problem."6 In many instances, it would seem rational for women to
reduce their investments to the extent those investments fail to yield
returns comparable to those of men who make similar labor-force
investments. Facing reduced opportunities for promotion as well as
lower wages, and likely having to confront at some point in one's
career a decision regarding how best to balance work and family,
women may decide that it is not worth pursuing extra degrees,
experience, or training when the investment offers a diminished rate
of return. As Vicki Schultz explains, "Like all workers, women adapt
their work aspirations and orientations rationally and purposefully,
but always within and in response to the constraints of organizational
arrangements not of their own making.""17
This adaptation is one way that the "choices" women make can
115. One commentator recently observed that among economists "the axiom of
exogenous preferences is as old as liberal political philosophy itself." Samuel Bowles,
Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic
Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75,75 (1998).
116. See Reuben Gronau, Sex-Related Wage Differentials and Women's Interrupted
Labor Careers-The Chicken or the Egg, 6 J. LAB. ECON. 277, 285-86 (1988) (noting that
employer expectations may reduce opportunities for training and promotion). For
additional discussions, see CYNTHIA B. LLOYD & BETH T. NIEMI, THE ECONOMICS OF
SEX DIFFERENTIALS 313 (1979) (observing that fewer job opportunities may reduce
incentives for investment); Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era:
Beyond Market Interactions, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 117, 123-24 (explaining how
perceptions can become self-fulfilling prophecies in the context of racial discrimination);
Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring
1991, at 22, 29 (discussing the dynamic effects that the labor market can have on human
capital investments).
117. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work. Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1750,1815-16 (1990).
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be influenced dramatically by the labor market. Another and
perhaps more significant way in which women's choices may be
shaped is through social conditioning that affects all of us, male and
female alike.118 There is a great volume of literature on the role that
social conditioning plays in creating our gendered world and in
particular in producing our segregated labor market, which I will only
touch upon here." 9 Just as it is difficult to contest the importance of
education and training for obtaining a desirable job, it is equally
difficult to dispute that many of our life decisions are significantly
influenced by social forces or that those forces tend to operate on a
distinctly gendered basis. These forces range from the way boys and
girls are treated during infancy to differential treatment in schools
regarding subjects, sports, leadership positions, and other facets of
school life, to the images provided in the media.1 2 As noted earlier,
the empirical data suggest that women are not choosing jobs that
make it easier for them to accommodate their nonmarket activities; a
more convincing explanation appears to be that women are
channeled, or crowded, into certain professions and jobs, even though
it may appear that this pattern is the product of individual choice. 21
Indeed, survey data indicate that "[w]omen consistently aspire to
more male dominated pursuits than those in which they are
118. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 836 (1989)
(challenging the choices currently available in the labor market and arguing for
restructurization that accounts for society's reproductive needs).
119. For an excellent overview of the literature, see generally VALIAN, supra note 13,
at 104-23 (discussing the sexual division of labor). For additional useful discussions on the
theme of social construction of gender, see, e.g., SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF
GENDER 133-75 (1993); BARBARA BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF
WOMEN 40-62 (1986); CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX,
GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 80-126 (1988); JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF
GENDER 144-93 (1994); ROBERTA S. SIGEL, AMBITION & ACCOMMODATION: HOW
WOMEN VIEW GENDER RELATIONS 9-23 (1996).
120. This socialization, sometimes called the social-control theory, continues
throughout our lives. See Jerry A. Jacobs, Gender and Academic Specialties: Trends
Among Recipients of College Degrees in the 1980s, 68 SOC. OF EDUC. 81, 96 (1995)
("Social control is not simply a matter of early life socialization that determines all adult
behavior; rather, continuing social constraints are required to keep women and men in
their sex-appropriate domains.").
121. See BERGMANN, supra note 119, at 87-114 (discussing ways in which jobs become
gendered); BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. ROOS, JOB QUEUES, GENDER
QUEUES: EXPLAINING WOMEN'S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 10-64 (1990)
(discussing how jobs can be transformed from male to female jobs). In her very
interesting study of female marines and male nurses, Christine Williams demonstrates how
gender roles persist even for those who choose nontraditional occupations. See generally
CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN & MEN IN
NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS (1989).
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employed,"' suggesting that many women would prefer to be in
occupations different from the ones they currently hold.
Identifying the causal connection is the very point at which the
issue of social conditioning versus autonomy becomes especially
complicated for purposes of interpretation, and by using the term
"channeling," I am revealing my own biases-biases that admittedly
cannot be fully supported by data.lm3 Indeed, in deciding between
choice or social construction, no data can provide a conclusive
explanation because even the best data likely would be tainted by
structural issues affected by discrimination." This problem certainly
affects the question posed earlier concerning whether women are
expressing preferences or responding to opportunities because, even
during interviews, we would not necessarily expect women to state
that they chose their jobs because social forces had limited their
opportunities or structured their decisions.125 Rather, any explanation
would likely involve numerous reasons and motivations, all of which
were influenced by a complex array of forces, some known and some
122. JACOBS, supra note 65, at 75. Jacobs observes that approximately 50% of women
aspire to a male-dominated occupation at some point in their careers. See id at 103.
123. There are also those who believe that our gendered choices are the product of
biology, a movement that seems to be gaining some influence in the form of sociobiology.
For a popular account, see ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 19-151 (1994). For a contrary view, namely that
biology determines virtually none of our behaviors, see JOHN DUPRE, THE DISORDER OF
THINGS: METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE (1993). This
issue engenders strong disagreement premised in substantial part on profound ideological
interests tied to the various interpretations. As one commentator has aptly noted: "The
debate over nature looks depressingly insoluble. Both sides can recognize the biological
evidence, for what it is worth; but they give it different significance." Julia Annas, Women
and the Quality of Life: Two Norms'or One?, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 279, 293 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). For a recent attempt to find some middle ground,
see Melvin Konner, Darwin's Truth, Jefferson's Vision, AM. PROSPECT, July-Aug. 1999, at
30.
124. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Realty of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 280-81 (1997) (discussing how discrimination makes it
difficult for us to evaluate causal effects).
125. Elizabeth Anderson makes the interesting suggestion that we should look at
people's attitudes about their choices rather than their revealed preferences to better
understand the choices people make. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS
AND ECONOMICS 202 (1993). "Individuals have positive or negative attitudes toward their
choices," she argues, "which reveal how well their choices reflect the valuations they have
of themselves and others." Id Although people's attitudes may provide more reliable
information than their actual choices, attitudes are also strongly shaped by choices,
because people seek to adapt to what is available to them. This insight animates much of
what is now becoming known as behavioral law and economics. To my mind the best (and
most entertaining) discussion of the issue remains JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES
IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983).
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unknown.126
Ultimately it is crucial to keep in mind the sheer multitude of
forces that play a role in our decisionmaking, leading to what has
been described, in a different context, as a state of relative
autonomy.127 To be sure, many individual women choose non-
traditional jobs, and just as many women undoubtedly happily choose
traditional female roles relatively free of social constraints. Likewise,
it is true that many people are able to exercise more choice in their
lives than others. At the same time, however, it is surely impossible
to deny that substantial sex segregation continues to define the labor
market and that segregation cannot be fully explained as the product
of unconstrained choice. As Deborah Rhode argues, "[T]o an
important extent, women's preferences are socially constructed and
constrained. The state does not simply respond to expressed desires;
it plays an active role in legitimating, suppressing, or redirecting
them."'" With this in mind, perhaps the best we can do at this point is
to suggest that, until women are afforded the same opportunities as
men and then choose differently from men, we should not blindly
conclude that the observed disparities are the product of choice.
This is not to suggest that we take the male role in the labor
market as the norm. On the contrary, I will argue that legislative
solutions should effectively treat women as the norm in the
workplace. 29 What I mean to suggest here is that women should not
be penalized for their perceived or expected behavior and that
equalizing choices between men and women may entail changing the
choices currently available to both men and women.' But before
126. For a recent discussion involving the difficult issue of determining when we can
say that our choices truly reflect personal inclinations, see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL,
STACKED DECK: A STORY OF SELFISHNESS IN AMERICA 101-32 (1998).
127. See WILLLAm C. DOWLING, JAMESON, ALTHUSSER, MARX: AN INTRODUCrION
TO THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOus 70-71, 136-37 (1984) (discussing Louis Althusser's
concept of relative autonomy).
128. Deborah L. Rhode, Changing Images of the State: Feminism and the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1994). Joan Williams has argued recently that "[s]ocial
critique requires a language that keeps choice and constraint simultaneously in focus, and
highlights the way social structures help create the lives they shape." WILLIAMS, supra
note 6, at 38.
129. See infra Part III.B.
130. At this point, it may be helpful to make clear that I am not advocating that women
be permitted to work part-time while maintaining full-time pay, benefits, and promotional
opportunities, or that there be no penalty for lengthy absences from the labor market.
Although it is difficult to dispute the attraction of part-time work at full-time pay,
requiring employers to ignore hours and substantial absences from the labor market may
impose a burden that would require overlooking real evidence regarding productivity.
Increasing part-time work for women, with benefits, is the strategy present in many
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discussing various strategies that might enable us to break up the
prevailing patterns, it will be useful to first discuss another theory-
statistical discrimination-that is often used to explain women's labor
market status.
C. The Role of Statistical Discrimination
Thus far, I have reviewed two important explanations for the
continued and persistent gender inequality in the workplace, namely
differences in human capital investments and the role "choice" plays
in perpetuating gender patterns. If neither of these theories explains
the observed gender inequalities, then what does? A theory that is
becoming increasingly prominent is known as statistical
discrimination, a concept that has had its strongest influence within
economics, although it is playing a growing role within law as well.'
The theory of statistical discrimination, discussed in detail below, is
generally treated as a theory that is distinct from the human capital
explanation of the wage gap, but the theories are closely related, as
differences in human capital investments fully inform the concept of
statistical discrimination. As will be discussed shortly, the primary
difference between the two theories is that whereas the human capital
theory is empirically based, statistical discrimination is an interpretive
theory often used to fill in the gaps left by other economic
explanations. In this Section, I will first discuss the theory of
statistical discrimination and explain how it adversely affects women's
European countries. See Blau & Kahn, supra note 6, at 122 (noting that Scandinavian
women are twice as likely as U.S. women to work part-time). In the United States, it
seems highly unlikely that we will move towards non-marginalized part-time work-work
that offers good wages and benefits, as well as opportunities for advancement. Therefore,
creating more part-time work currently does not appear to be a viable means toward
reducing existing labor market inequality.
131. See, e.g., Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM.
ECON. REv. 659 (1972). For additional discussions of the statistical discrimination theory,
see generally Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in
Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB REL. REv. 175 (1977); Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job
Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83 (Anthony H. Pascal
ed., 1972); Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
228 (1986). For helpful discussions within the law, most of which are critical of the theory,
see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REv. 817, 850-52 (1991); David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-
Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination for
"High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 63-85 (1998); Driucilla Cornell &
William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism: Economics,
Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 595, 634-54 (1999);
David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The
Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619,1622-23 (1991).
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labor force opportunities. Next, contrary to the common consensus, I
will argue that statistical discrimination should not be considered a
rational employer response to women's labor force behavior, but
instead is based largely on erroneous assumptions regarding women's
commitment to the labor force that have persisted well after
substantial changes in women's labor force patterns. Finally, I will
offer some reasons why the practice persists despite its inadequate
statistical underpinning.
1. The Theory of Statistical Discrimination
The general concept of statistical discrimination is relatively
straightforward: when employers lack perfect information and when
it would be too costly to collect such information, employers will
resort to group averages to determine the potential productivity of
individuals.' In the context of this Article, this practice means that
employers often will treat women differently from men because, on
average, women are more likely to leave the workforce to have and to
raise children, and these potential exits can be costly for employers.133
With respect to prospective employees, relying on group averages can
be particularly important because it is often difficult for an employer
to obtain reliable information in advance as to the likelihood that any
particular individual will later leave the workforce. Asking an
applicant directly about present and future family obligations may
raise concerns under antidiscrimination laws depending on how the
question is framed and will rarely yield accurate information, as
employees generally know the desired answer. Therefore, to the
extent employers consider the information, it is often contended that
they are left to rely on their group observations as the best available
information.1M
As a concept, there is nothing particularly insidious about relying
on statistical information to make judgments about individuals. After
all, such judgments are an important component of law school
admissions decisions, 35 and hardly a day goes by when we don't
132. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 45, at 440-43.
133. For discussions along these lines, see Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum,
Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 2154, 2168-69 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender
Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 609-12 (1993).
134. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 133, at 621.
135. Law schools typically place substantial weight on Law School Admissions Test
(LSAT) scores, which offer group predictions about the likelihood of success during the
first year. See Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and Common
Law of Admissions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065, 1070-71 (1997)
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resort to group averages as the basis for some sort of prediction or
determination. Nevertheless, relying on group observations can also
lead to unfair treatment, and in the workplace, statistical
discrimination based on gender is generally unlawful-even when it
might be efficient.'36 Thus, it is important to see just how inaccurate
the use of statistical information can be and how it affects all women,
even those who display persistent workforce attachment throughout
their careers.
2. Is Statistical Discrimination Justified?
Earlier we saw just how inaccurate the theory of statistical
discrimination is when applied to women's likely workforce behavior.
After having children, most women return to work within three to six
months, with most women returning to the kind of work and hours
they had before giving birth. 37 These facts suggest that, on average,
women who had a weak labor force commitment prior to having
children will be the ones most likely not to return to work, or to quit
their position after having returned for some period of time and
finding the demands of work and family too taxing. 38  Yet, as
previously noted, employers contend that because it is difficult to
know who those employees will be-just as it is difficult to know in
advance who the committed or superior employees will be-it is
efficient for them to resort to a gender barometer, knowing that it
remains more likely that women will leave the workforce than men.
Employer reliance on gender data need not be explicit; it can play
itself out in subtle ways, such as not giving women long-term
assignments, not reaching out to mentor young female employees, or
evaluating their work product differently based on a particular
(discussing the role of LSAT scores in admissions decisions). As is well known, these
scores are quite inaccurate as to particular individuals but offer some prediction for the
group as a whole, thereby capturing the essence of statistical discrimination.
136. See City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,711 (1978). In
Manhart, the Supreme Court invalidated a state policy that required female employees to
make higher pension contributions than men because women tend to live longer and thus,
as a class, would likely receive greater pension benefits than men. See id at 707-11.
Although the parties, and the Court accepted as true the factual basis for the policy, the
Court held that the practice was "in direct conflict with both the language and the policy
of the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 711; see also Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred
Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074 (1983) (per
curiam) (invalidating the sex-based pension practice of paying out less money to women).
137. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
138. See Light & Ureta, supra note 101, at 179-80 (finding no evidence that it is more
difficult to identify female nonquitters than male).
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perception of women's commitment to the workforce."9
The use of statistical information in this fashion is routinely
treated as an efficient employment practice and is often referred to as
rational discrimination." ° Such treatment, however, embodies some
of the sophistry that defines much of traditional law and economics,
namely the notion that if it were not efficient, employers would not
do it.'4 ' There are by now well-developed explanations for why
employers engage in practices that cannot be fully described as
rational, which will be discussed in more detail below,142 but here I
wish to explain as a theoretical matter why the assumption of
139. See VALIAN, supra note 13, at 217-49 (discussing ways that discrimination can
adversely affect women's careers in academia); Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 587 (1996) ("[Fjemale lawyers consistently report receiving
fewer opportunities for mentoring, business development, and desirable assignments than
their male colleagues."). For a related discussion regarding how these issues arise in law
firms with respect to racial stereotypes, see David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are
There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 493 514-84 (1996). Although many of these practices would violate Title VII,
they are notoriously difficult to prove. See Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident:
Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1234, 1241-43 (1999) (discussing the difficulty of
proving subtle discrimination).
140. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 243 (1997) ("From the
employer's point of view, statistical discrimination is 'rational' or efficient and profit-
maximizing."); EDMUND S. PHELPS, REWARDING WORK 114 (1997) (discussing rational
discrimination); James Albrecht & Susan Vroman, Evaluating Policies to Reduce the
Gender Gap: An Economic Approach, 82 GEO. L.J. 69, 72 (1993) ("It is rational for an
employer with such beliefs to engage in statistical discrimination in the sense of requiring
that female applicants for good jobs show more objective evidence of a long-term
commitment to the workforce than must their male counterparts."); Keith N. Hylton &
Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence,
and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 247 (1996) ("[T]he theory of
statistical discrimination.. posits that racial discrimination reflects rational predictions of
the behavior of the group subject to discrimination."); Susan Bisom Rapp, Of Motives and
Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases,
1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029, 1089 (equating statistical discrimination with rational
discrimination); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2452
(1994) ("Insofar as statistical discrimination is outlawed, the government has singled out
one form of rational categorization."); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND.
LJ. 1129,1142 (1999) (identifying statistical discrimination as rational discrimination).
141. Robert Kuttner has recently offered a similar criticism:
Economists enamored of pure markets begin with the theory, and hang models
on assumptions that cannot themselves be challenged.... [I]f wages for manual
workers are declining, it must be that their economic value is declining.... If
commercial advertising leads consumers to buy shoddy or harmful products, they
must be 'maximizing their utility' .... How do we know that? Because to do
anything else would be irrational. And how do we know that individuals always
behave rationally? Because that is the premise from which we begin.
ROBERT KUmNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 9
(1996).
142. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
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rationality that underlies statistical discrimination is unacceptably
overbroad. Indeed, whether the practice of treating women
differently because of their greater propensity to leave the workforce
to care for children is truly efficient involves an empirical question
that is very rarely tested and is generally context dependent.43 At a
minimum, determining the efficiency of relying on group averages
would require knowing the actual costs of the labor market
disruptions, as well as their expected probabilities, and then balancing
those costs against the lost productivity that occurs through the
differential treatment women receive-the costs of the lack of
mentoring, the devaluation of women's work product, and the higher
turnover that might result from this treatment.'" Given these costs, it
also would be important to know the cost of obtaining more
individualized information, which in any calculus should be weighed
against the costs of engaging in statistical discrimination.
Let me sketch an example. Suppose an employer believes there
is a 30% chance a female employee will not return from work after
having a child. In determining the cost of that disruption, an
employer first would want to assess the cost of the potential turnover,
which would take into account its normal turnover rate, as it would be
highly unusual for an employer to have no turnover at all. It then
would want to determine the marginal cost of the turnover associated
with the potential that an employee will not return to work to care for
a child. As discussed in the next Part, employers have had little
trouble covering employees on temporary maternity leave, and in
many jobs replacement costs associated with additional individuals
are not particularly high because such costs are so routine.145 In this
respect, it is not the absolute cost of a replacement that matters but
the marginal or relative cost that should concern an employer.
Balanced against those costs would be the costs of relying on
group averages. Assuming an employer is considering not hiring or
promoting women, or reducing its hiring or promotion of women, that
employer would want to calculate the costs that might arise from
foreclosing an entire group of qualified applicants, particularly when
the firm's competitors may reap the benefits of that policy. A firm
with a poor reputation for hiring or retaining women will likely suffer
143. See Light & Ureta, supra note 101, at 158 (noting that "any conclusion about
whether statistical discrimination is 'justified' depends entirely on which birth cohorts are
being examined").
144. See VALIAN, supra note 13, at 174-86 (discussing the effects of discrimination on
women's careers).
145. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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some market disadvantage in hiring women, potentially leaving it
with a lower-quality applicant pool. Similarly, if a firm chooses to pay
women less or to invest in them less, there also might be a
corresponding loss in productivity while the employee is on the job,
and that loss may spill over to other employees. Male employees who
know that their female counterparts are at a competitive
disadvantage may reduce their own work effort in response to their
competitive edge.146
An important additional factor is the length of the expected
labor force disruptions, as employers certainly would be unjustified in
treating any leave as unduly costly or all leaves as equally costly.
Although permanent exits may be costly (depending on the job and
its natural turnover rate), the short labor force disruptions of most
women should not create equivalent costs.147 An employee's skills are
unlikely to recede with a short time off from the labor market,
although at a certain point, depending on the nature of the job, there
is likely to be some significant loss of skills. For example, a lawyer
taking six months off is likely to miss little that cannot be regained
quickly, but taking two or three years off may lead to a significant
depreciation, as new cases are decided and skills honed in the
courtroom or elsewhere wane.
As a result, from the statistical discrimination perspective, an
employer ought to be interested in determining the cost from a three
or six-month leave that may occur once or twice in the course of a
career, rather than assuming that women are likely to exit the labor
market permanently.' 8 Although productivity is notoriously difficult
to measure, the cost of the workforce disruption caused by women's
childbearing does not appear so daunting, especially when measured
against other anticipated disruptions, such as sickness, vacation,
illness, injury, or jury service. Indeed, to know whether employers
are engaging in a form of statistical discrimination that ought to be
146. See Andrew Schotter & Keith Weiglet, Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal
Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results, 107 Q. J. ECON.
511, 538-39 (1992) (applying tournament theory to the workplace); Michael Selmi, Testing
for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV.
1251,1304-05 (1995) (discussing ways in which employers create workplace competition to
spur productivity).
147. This is also true with respect to turnovers that occur early in workers' careers
because such turnovers are frequent among both men and women. See Light & Ureta,
supra note 101, at 157 (noting the high propensity of "young workers ... to quit their jobs
regardless of gender").
148. As noted earlier, this is the average length of leave for childbearing. See supra
notes 89-90 and accompanying text. Within the statistical discrimination model, the
average is the appropriate figure to use. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 45, at 41.
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defined as rational, as opposed to stereotypical or animus-based
discrimination, it is important to know how employers weigh these
other potential labor market disruptions for which individualized
predictive information is difficult to obtain. Given that most leaves
for childbirth are predictable, infrequent, and of short duration, it
seems irrational for an employer to single out pregnancy-related
leave for particular treatment among all the potential labor force
disruptions.
Nevertheless, discussions concerning statistical discrimination
and the gender gap often treat childbearing as if it were the only
condition that employees bring to the labor market that may impose
costs on employers. There are, however, numerous other conditions
that may impose equal or higher costs, yet rarely seem to be taken
into account. An employer concerned with potential lost productivity
due to workplace disruptions might want to screen out those
employees who are prone to alcoholism, illnesses, or injuries, all of
which are more prominent among men. Recent statistics indicate that
men are three times as likely as women to be binge drinkers and four
times as likely to be heavy drinkers, with 23% of men defined as
binge drinkers.149 Similarly, "women incurred less than one-tenth of
job-related fatal injuries and one-third of the non-fatal injuries and
illnesses that required time off to recuperate."'50 In other words,
there are many potentially costly behaviors employees bring to the
workplace that correlate with gender, and it is difficult to imagine,
and certainly wrong to assume, that the only differences that matter
are the potential short-term exits of women to have children.
Finally, it would be most efficient for employers to use such
knowledge or information in the hiring process, where it is often
difficult to assess employees' future labor force behavior. Once an
employee is on the job, however, the employer is in a position to
collect reliable information unavailable at the time of hire, especially
given that past employment behavior remains the best predictor of
future workforce attachment for women after childbirth.' Yet, there
is substantial evidence that women are disadvantaged throughout
149. See The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, Preliminary
Results from the 1997 Household Survey on Drug Abuse tbls.15, 16 (visited Jan. 17, 2000)
<http://www.health.orglpubs/97hhs/httoe.htm>.
150. Guy A. Toscano et al., Work Injuries and Illnesses Occurring to Women,
COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS, Summer 1998, at 16, 16 (footnote omitted).
As a way of reducing costs further, employers also may wish to screen out those most
likely to engage in sexual harassment, which costs employers both in legal judgments and
in the reduced productivity of both the harasser and the victim of the harassment.
151. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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their careers and considerable evidence to suggest that more
discrimination occurs after, rather than at, the hiring stage, indicating
that the practice is less national than is often assumed.152
By questioning the efficiency of statistical discrimination, I do
not mean to suggest that the theory fails to offer some explanatory
power as to why women are paid less and offered fewer promotional
opportunities than men. On the contrary, I believe the theory
provides important insights into employers' practices, because when
making employment decisions employers do seem to take into
account women's greater likelihood of leaving the workforce to care
for children. They do so, however, in an exaggerated way, and such
practices are at best crude predictors and likely inefficient, or at least
as likely to be inefficient as efficient. Certainly, statistical
discrimination should not be tolerated to the extent it is based on
inaccurate perceptions of women's labor market attachment,
perceptions that might become self-fulfilling prophecies as women
adapt to the lesser opportunities available to them.1 53
3. The Need for Government Intervention
At this juncture, the economic model typically described in the
law and economics literature likely would still reject the need for
governmental intervention. To the extent employers continue to rely
on inaccurate group averages, according to this model, the practice is
unlikely to persist because competitive market pressures eventually
would eliminate the use of these averages. Firms that rely on better
information ultimately would obtain a more efficient workforce and
thus drive out less efficient competitors.' 4 This is a familiar but
152. See VALIAN, supra note 13, at 225 (observing that in academia "recent female
graduates start out on an equal salary footing with males but lose that equality as early as
three to eight years post-Ph.D."); Bielby & Bielby, supra note 36, at 223-25 (finding
female television writers face continuous disadvantage throughout their careers); Jacobs,
supra note 62, at 290 (documenting wage discrimination experienced by female managers);
Janet Rosenberg et al., Now That We Are Here: Discrimination, Disparagement, and
Harassment at Work and the Experience of Women Lawyers, 7 GENDER & SOC'Y 415,422
(1993) (finding that female attorneys perceive that more discrimination occurs on the job
than in initial hiring decisions).
153. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
154. The classic elaboration of the theory, although developed in the context of animus
rather than statistical discrimination, is GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 153-60 (2d ed. 1971). Although it has largely gone unnoticed, Becker
has since claimed that his theory has been misunderstood because he originally argued
that a variety of factors, including discrimination by employees and customers, could
sustain discriminatory practices. See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TAsTEs 142
(1996).
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rather tired argument that has lost most of its appeal outside of the
law.155 Within the economics and sociological literature, it is now
widely acknowledged that competitive market pressures have not and
will not eliminate broadscale discrimination in labor markets. 6
One reason discrimination persists in labor markets is that so
many employees are ready substitutes for one another. Accordingly,
an employer may not lose much by choosing a male over a female
candidate for a particular position, even when there is no
productivity-based reason to do so. 57 Additionally, discrimination
may persist in labor markets, as John Donohue has argued, because
employees often have restricted mobility and therefore are unable to
gravitate to nondiscriminating employers. This characteristic
distinguishes the labor market from, for example, the stock market,
where true mobility exists.58 As noted earlier, whether or not these
facts make an employer's practices efficient is ultimately a difficult
155. For recent legal discussions, see Wayne R. Cohen, An Economic Analysis of the
Issues Surrounding AIDS in the Workplace: In the Long Run, the Path of Truth and
Reason Cannot Be Diverted, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1199, 1226-27 (1992) (noting that firms
are unlikely to maintain a discriminatory workplace); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Sex, You Say
You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the Transformation of Culture Through
Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1622 (1997) (arguing that employers will
likely forego discrimination in competitive markets); Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 140,
at 250-51 (suggesting that lending discrimination should not persist in a competitive
market); Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and
Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 840 (1995) (same).
156. For an excellent discussion of the various economic theories of discrimination and
their inability to explain the persistence of labor market discrimination, see Jeremiah
Cotton, Labor Markets and Racial Inequality, in LABOR ECONOMICS: PROBLEMS IN
ANALYZING LABOR MARKETS 183, 183-208 (William Darity, Jr. ed., 1993); see also
Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1998, at 91, 91-100 (discussing ways in which race discrimination can
survive even in competitive markets); William A. Darity, Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence
on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1998, 63, 82-87 (discussing the persistence of discrimination). For discussions
relating to gender, see Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and
Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1673 (1991)
(arguing that it is unrealistic to expect the market to eliminate sex discrimination because
women are undervalued and because segregation creates employment taboos); Paula
England, Wage Appreciation and Depreciation A Test of Neoclassical Economic
Explanations of Occupational Sex Segregation, 62 SOC. FORCES 726, 741-42 (1984)
(suggesting that the theory fails to explain sex segregation); Paul Milgrom & Sharon
Oster, Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis, 102 Q. J. ECON.
453, 456-58 (1987) (arguing that women and minorities remain invisible in the
marketplace because their skills and abilities are undervalued).
157. See Charny & Gulati, supra note 131, at 76-77 (discussing the low cost of
discrimination when employees are alike).
158. See John J. Donohue, III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583,2596-97 (1994).
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empirical question, but we certainly know that discrimination has
persisted to a far greater extent than neoclassical economic theory has
predicted. Economist Barbara Bergmann commented some time ago
that "[w]e see thousands of business failures every year in the United
States, so firms do make fatal mistakes; but no one has ever reported
seeing a firm that discriminated reduced to ruin by a less bigoted
competitor."'' 9 This statement still holds true today.
Another reason for the stubborn pace of change is that old habits
die hard. Practices that may be inefficient in some sense can become
an accepted part of a business practice and thus can be difficult to
uproot. As Kenneth Arrow has noted, the network of personal
interactions that form a business culture can "leave plenty of room
for discriminatory beliefs and preferences to play a role, which would
be much less likely in a market subject to competitive pressures."160
These interactions include word-of-mouth hiring and selection-
process biases, which render decisionmakers prone to hiring
applicants who are most like themselves.'61
Individuals also tend to resist information that contradicts their
existing beliefs or stereotypes, providing yet another reason why
statistical discrimination may outlast its empirical foundation. It is
well documented that individuals seek out information that will
confirm their stereotypes, while ignoring or downplaying contrary
information. 62 Consistent information typically remains more salient,
so that a woman who leaves the workforce after having a child is
159. BERGMANN, supra note 119, at 139.
160. Arrow, supra note 156, at 98. In the same article, Arrow acknowledges that there
is evidence of racial discrimination in the economy today. See id. at 99.
161. See id at 98 (noting that "[tihe network model seems most appropriate for the
labor market"); see also Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, Culture, Information and
Screening Discrimination, 104 J. POL. ECON. 542, 556-58 (1996) (arguing that individuals
favor associating with people of their own type because they believe it is easier to judge
their abilities); Cornell & Bratton, supra note 131, at 624-30 (explaining how English-only
rules are often motivated by in-group bias).
162. See John M. Darley & Russell H. Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation Processes
Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 867, 876 (1986) (noting that
"[a] great deal of research suggests that ambiguous behaviors tend to be perceived in a
biased manner"); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979) (contending that in the face of ambiguous evidence,
people emphasize confirmatory evidence while discounting nonconfirmatory information);
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 26 (1998) ("A range of
research suggests that once forming strong hypotheses, people are often too inattentive to
new information contradicting their hypotheses."); David M. Sanbonmatsu et al.,
Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 892, 899 (1993) (concluding that people use biased
strategies so that causal hypotheses are confirmed).
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likely to be remembered whereas the women who return after a
month or two of leave are not.163
Finally, another important, and I believe a closely related, reason
that such habits die hard is that those in power, in this instance men,
are reluctant to relinquish that power and, thus, utilize a variety of
often subtle strategies to preserve their privileged positions. They do
not necessarily act out of animus, but more out of a desire to
vindicate and preserve their places in society."64 People naturally
want to believe that their success results from just procedures and
honest talent, even if we all know that this is not always the case given
that so much of our society is rooted in illegitimate and
discriminatory processes that have long coattails-processes that
often were and are intended to subordinate women.16 While the
means of that subordination surely have lessened, they remain
stubbornly in place and help explain why change has not occurred
more quickly. Men have a great deal invested in preserving gender
roles, both as a way of understanding their world and as a means of
enhancing their individual economic well-being. Reducing gender
163. See VALIAN, supra note 13, at 168 ("We interpret the information we receive
about women ... in the light of our beliefs."); Rabin, supra note 162, at 30 ("A pervasive
fact about human judgment is that people disproportionately weight salient, memorable,
or vivid evidence .... "); Rhode, supra note 139, at 588 (noting that the confirmatory bias
means that employers will remember the times mothers leave work early but not the times
when they stay late). For an extended treatment of cognitive psychology and how it might
inform our analysis of discrimination issues, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995).
164. See FAYE J. CROSBY, JUGGLING: THE UNEXPECTED ADVANTAGES OF
BALANCING CAREER & HOME FOR WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES 159-77 (1991)
(documenting subtle patterns of male resistance); LORBER, supra note 119, at 225-52
(describing ways in which men "guard the gates" and prevent women from achieving
equality).
165. Susan Moller Okin argues that husbands often exert influence over their wives'
decisions not out of a "concern for the aggregate welfare of the household but... [out of]
their desire to retain the authority and privilege that accrues to them by virtue of being the
family's breadwinner." OKIN, supra note 114, at 147; see also Wax, supra note 33, at 668-
72 (arguing that women's lack of bargaining power in marriage restricts their labor market
activities). Kathryn Abrams has also demonstrated how sexual harassment has been used
as a means of establishing male control and masculine norms in the workplace. See
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169,1205-17 (1998). Even Judge Posner has recently argued that men may want to expel
women from the workplace as a way of preserving status. See Gertrud M. Fremling &
Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual
Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1084-85 (1999). For an interesting discussion as to
how this process of gender definition and subordination occurs, see Karen D. Pyke, Class-
Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender, Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10
GENDER & Soc'y 527 (1996).
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
inequality in the workplace may cause a reevaluation of "men's" and
"women's" work and also may decrease the income and prestige of
men, even though it may increase family income overall. 166 Changing
existing roles also may send a signal of condemnation to previous
generations, one that is sure to be resisted. Suggesting that men need
to take time off to care for their children, for example, may imply that
an earlier generation of men were not as good fathers as they should
have been or believed they were, or that the old model has outlasted
its utility.
This focus on preserving privilege may appear somewhat difficult
to square with an economic focus, but it highlights why we must not
make efficiency the touchstone of our legal structures and why we
also should not assume that the market is a frictionless machine
grinding its way toward maximizing social welfare. On the contrary,
the use of statistical discrimination perpetuates gender stratification
and inequality and, therefore, reduces our social welfare. Even if we
treat the use of statistical information to disadvantage women as an
efficient employment practice, there are social costs that need to be
considered in determining the desirability of the practice. By
definition, statistical discrimination is overbroad in its reach, which
means that relying on group averages has its greatest adverse effect
on those individuals who do not fit the average, or the assumed
average-in this case, those women who do not leave, and do not
intend to leave, the workforce for their family commitments.1 67 The
result of this overbroad judgment is that the employers will waste or
underutilize talent and may find higher turnover among their female
employees, all of which negatively affects our social welfare.16
166. Christine Williams has argued that men benefit by preserving gender roles
"because our society has traditionally rewarded masculine qualities more highly than
feminine qualities. It avails men to monopolize masculine qualities, emphasize them in
themselves, and enforce femininity on their female counterparts." WILLIAMS, supra note
121, at 8-9. She concludes that "[mien have historically used the occupational realm not
only to secure economic advantages over women, but also to establish and affirm their
essential difference from-and personal sense of superiority over-women." Id. at 133;
see also Susan T. Fiske & Peter Glick, Ambivalence and Stereotypes Cause Sexual
Harassment: A Theory with Implications for Organizational Change, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 97,
105 (1995) (arguing that "[t]he introduction of women into male-dominated jobs poses a
threat to the gender-identity based self-esteem of men in these jobs").
167. See VALIAN, supra note 13, at 257 (discussing how statistical discrimination makes
life difficult for all women).
168. See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social
Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340, 342 (1983) (arguing
that statistical discrimination can lead to "suboptimal levels of human capital"). The
question of whether women have a higher turnover rate than men has generated
considerable controversy. Both men and women tend to have unstable early careers as
[Vol. 78
GENDER WAGE GAP
In this respect, the social cost of statistical discrimination may be
far greater than the private cost to firms, given that individual firms
likely are not forfeiting significant profits through their policies but
that we pay the cumulative cost socially. A society committed to
providing equality of opportunity to women also should be
committed to eradicating the structures that perpetuate inequality.
As a result, we ought to find ways to preclude employers from
making statistical judgments that greatly disadvantage women and at
best provide minimal efficiency returns.
D. Men and Family Leave
One way of moving toward the goal of greater gender equality
would be to find ways to encourage, or induce, men to take leave
around the birth of their children and ultimately to spend more time
caring for their children. All of the issues discussed so far indicate
that the best means of eradicating persistent labor market inequalities
would be to change the work patterns of men, rather than those of
women-something that we as a society, to date, have focused all too
little on. The cumulative disadvantages women face in the workplace
are all directly tied to their greater devotion to their children, which
helps explain their lower pay, extreme job segregation, poorer
advancement, and greater likelihood to miss work or to drop out of
the workforce to care for their children. Yet, despite frequent
proclamations regarding their desire to spend more time with their
families, men continue to work longer hours while maintaining their
lower levels of housework and child care.169 All the relevant studies
they search for better experience and job matches, and those experiences do not seem to
affect labor patterns negatively. See Gardecki & Neumark, supra note 42, at 317 (finding
"that adult labor outcomes (defined as of the late 20s or early to mid-30s) are for the most
part unrelated to the stability of early labor market experiences"); Light & Ureta, supra
note 88, at 157 ("While women are more prone than men to leave the labor force, the fact
is that young workers are likely to quit their jobs regardless of gender."). A recent study
of a large insurance company found that while women had a higher quit rate early in their
careers, after five years with the firms women were thereafter less likely than men to leave
their employment. See Nachum Sicherman, Gender Differences in Departures from a
Large Firm, 49 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 484,488-91 (1996). Women, however, do seem
to suffer a greater penalty for early turnover, likely because of their stronger need to
signal workplace commitment to employers. See Gardecki & Neunark, supra note 42, at
319. Women also tend to work in industries with higher turnover rates. See W. Kip
Viscusi, Sex Differences in Worker Quitting, 62 REv. ECON. & STAT. 388, 397 (1980)
("Almost the entire predicted male-female quit difference and half of the actual difference
can be explained by differences in their jobs and regional economic conditions.").
169. A study conducted by the Families and Work Institute indicates that fathers were
just as likely as mothers to express a willingness to trade salary for dependent assistance
benefits. See Ellen Galinsky et al., The Role of Employers in Addressing the Needs of
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indicate that few men avail themselves of family leave even when it is
available, and the average length of the leave men take is about five
days. 7
0
As the preceding discussion makes clear, if we can get men to
shoulder more of the home burden, women's equality in the
workplace likely will improve substantially.'7 ' Getting men to take
more leave around the birth of their children will be an important but
difficult task, and in Part III, I will explore ways in which we might be
able to create incentives for men to take such leave. Currently, men
proffer a great many excuses for why they do not take more leave,
even though for at least the last twenty years men have expressed an
interest in equal parenting and a desire to take parental leave.172
Indeed, if there is anything universal in worldwide patterns relating to
parental leave, it is that men proclaim a much greater desire for leave
than they appear willing to take. 3
Employed Parents, 52 J. Soc. ISSUES 111, 119 (1996). Before the birth of a child, men and
women generally express a commitment to shared child care and housework. See Diane
N. Ruble et al., Changes in the Marital Relationship During the Transition to First-Time
Motherhood. Effects of Violated Expectations Concerning Division of Household Labor,
55 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 78, 80 (1988). Polls likewise demonstrate that
women and men both feel they should spend more time with their children. See Morin &
Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at Al (noting that "equally large majorities of working men and
women said they... wished they could devote more time to their families"); see also supra
note 12 and accompanying text (citing representative studies).
170. See Janet Shibley Hyde et al., Fathers and Parental Leave: Attitudes and
Experiences, 14 J. FAM. ISSUES 616, 629 (1993) (finding a mean leave time of five days
among surveyed fathers); Janet Shibley Hyde, Women and Maternity Leave: Empirical
Data and Public Policy, 19 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 299,307 (1995) (noting that the average
leave for men is about five days); Joseph H. Pleck, Are "Family-Supportive" Employer
Policies Relevant to Men? in MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 217, 228 (J.C. Hood ed., 1993)
(finding through interviews that the average leave for men was 5.3 days).
171. See Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 88, at 18 (finding a persistent and significant
wage loss caused by extended leaves); Juhn & Murphy, supra note 25, at 93 (noting the
large negative effect the presence of children has on women's employment); Shapiro &
Mott, supra note 99, at 272 (finding that a consistent labor force attachment of women
following childbirth resulted in a wage premium of 19%); Jane Waldfogel, Working
Mothers Then and Now: A Cross-Cohort Analysis of the Effects of Maternity Leave on
Women's Pay, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 14, at 92,
98 (finding that family status explained approximately 50% of the wage gap in 1991).
172. For example, in a 1978 poll, three quarters of the respondents, male and female
alike, thought housework should be shared equally when both partners worked. See
CROSBY, supra note 164, at 148. In 1986, Working Woman magazine reported that "[n]ine
in ten Americans today agree that it is important for fathers to spend as much time with
their children as mothers do." Basia Hefiwig et al., How Working Women Have Changed
America, WORKING WOMAN, Nov. 1986, at 129, 134.
173. In a survey of recent books, sociologist Michael Kimmel observed:
A 1989 New York Times article is typical of the many work-family surveys
conducted in recent years: in it, two-fifths of the fathers interviewed said they
would quit their jobs if they could spend more time with their children. But the
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The most common reason that men offer for not taking more
leave time is that it would be economically infeasible given that they
tend to have higher incomes than their wives and therefore would
have to sacrifice more income if they were to take leave.' 4 But men's
reluctance to take leave cannot be fully explained by their economic
situation because men with working wives appear far more capable of
altering their behavior than they have done so far. In fact, getting
men to take more leave may lead to greater wealth for many men.
The reason that it currently makes sense for women to sacrifice their
incomes, to the extent it makes sense at all, is because they are paid
less than men, but an important reason they are paid less than men is
that they have the primary responsibility for child rearing.17 If this
pattern were broken, women's earnings would likely rise and-as
long as men's income did not suffer a proportional decline-overall
wealth would increase. Even if the change results in no increase in
wealth, it surely can be no argument to prefer men's higher incomes
at the expense of women's incomes. The only way this vicious cycle
can be derailed is for something to give, and that must be men's
current advantage.
That said, it is not at all clear that significant economic sacrifices
would be necessary for more men to take longer leaves. Nearly one
quarter of women now earn more than their husbands, reflecting a
substantial increase during the last decade, 6 and approximately one-
third of married women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-
four roughly have achieved wage parity with their husbands. 7 7 These
two facts suggest that a substantial number of men could take family
desire to change is often more rhetorical than real; few men would actually
switch places with their nonworking wives if given the opportunity.
Michael S. Kimmel, What Do Men Want?, HARv. Bus. RaV., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 50, 56
(footnote omitted).
174. See Janet Shibley Hyde et al., supra note 170, at 635 (identifying "economic
necessity" as a reason why men do not take more leave); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and
Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (1994) ("The father's primary role in
providing economic security functions as a barrier to increased parental involvement in
the family.").
175. See Becker, supra note 82, at 937 (noting the vicious circle that subordinates
women by paying them less and thus increases the attractiveness of their nonmarket
opportunities).
176. See Anne E. Winkler, Earnings of Husbands and Wives in Dual-Earner Families,
121 MoNTHLY LAB. RaV., Apr. 1998, at 42, 44 ("Data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) show that the proportion of dual-earner couples in which wives earned more
than their husbands increased from 16 percent in 1981 to 23 percent in 1996.").
177. See Blau, supra note 41, at 149. As noted earlier with respect to the legal
profession, wage disparities tend to increase over time and women tend to begin their
careers at greater salary parity with men. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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leave that approximates the leave of their wives without making
economic sacrifices, and a quarter of married men should be taking
longer leaves than their wives if economics were truly driving their
decisions. 78 Although men often claim they do not have access to
leave, studies indicate that parental leave is available to men at a far
higher rate than their utilization would indicate. Between 18% and
36% of surveyed employers offered parental leave to men even
before the FMLA was implemented.179 Often the leave was unpaid,
as was also true for much of the leave offered to women, but men also
had access to their vacation and, in some instances, sick leave. Also,
as many women do, they could store up their vacation in anticipation
of the birth of a child.
Another reason men offer for their inability to take leave is that
they fear they will suffer workplace repercussions from their
employers.8 0 This explanation may or may not be true, but should
not be given undue weight.' As discussed above, women currently
face substantial penalties for taking leave, and again, it cannot be
argued that men, but only men, should be spared workplace
repercussions when they take leave. Given the existing workplace
norms, there is some evidence that men suffer greater penalties for
178. One indication that economics is not the only factor at work is that very few
families even consider the option of having the man stay home or alter his work hours
after they have a child. In her study of equal parenting families, Francine Deutsch
observed:
[A] taken-for-granted quality of inequality with respect to paid work is common
among ... families [with unequal parenting], even ones where the women had
high-powered professions. When I asked why it was the mother who cut back to
part-time paid work in many of these families, the question didn't seem to make
sense to them. That the father could be the one to stay home had never been
discussed or even given a moment's thought.
DEUTSCH, supra note 60, at 58.
179. See Malin, supra note 174, at 1072 (citing studies). Prior to the passage of the
FMLA, a higher percentage of employers made leave available to their female employees
than to their male employees, but the numbers were not drastically different. Citing a
study by the Catalyst organization released in 1986, Malin reports that 37% of employers
offered parental leave to fathers while 52% offered such leave to mothers. See id.
180. See Janet Shibley Hyde et al., supra note 170, at 629 (finding that 23% of surveyed
men thought their supervisors would be supportive of leave, while 63% thought their
supervisors would respond negatively); Marlin, supra note 174, at 1077-78 (discussing
perceived employer hostility to men taking leave).
181. Given that so few men take leave, the evidence of actual retribution is largely
speculative. A contrasting view was presented in a recent study of Norwegian fathers who
took leave, one of the few studies of its kind. Although the study involved a limited
sample, the authors found that the men who took leave were "admired both by their
colleagues and their friends" and did not appear to experience adverse consequences from
their employers. See Berit Brandth & Elin Kvande, Masculinity and Child Care: The
Reconstruction of Fathering, 46 Soc. REV. 293,308-09 (1998).
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taking leave than women because their leave-taking violates the
prevailing gender norms." Employers, however, are currently able
to exact stiff penalties against men because so few men take leave. If
a greater number of men were to take leave, it is unlikely that
employers could persist in retaliating against these employees
because the norm of leave-taking would shift to render those who
take leave the norm rather than the exception. After all, employers
cannot penalize all of their employees, and if they do so in the form of
lower wages, then it would be appropriate to view that as a cost the
employees are willing to pay, just as they now pay for other
workplace benefits, rather than a penalty employers exact.
In addition to the economic considerations, gender norms
certainly play a role in determining leave patterns because child
rearing continues to be seen as women's work, and the notion of
taking leave to care for a newborn may threaten the existing roles.l 3
These issues will have to be challenged if we are to make greater
progress toward workplace equality. As noted earlier, making more
progress will require finding ways to get men to take more leave,
although we should also realize that men are unlikely to do so
voluntarily and will require greater incentives than currently exist to
break up the existing patterns. In the next Part, I will discuss why the
FMLA is unlikely to disrupt current gender roles and explore ways in
which family leave might be altered so as to create the conditions for
greater workplace equality.
II. THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT AND GENDER STEREOTYPES
The Family and Medical Leave Act was intended to ameliorate
some of the difficulties that parents encounter in balancing work and
family commitments. As discussed earlier, an effective family leave
law, one that counteracts some of the gender norms that currently
182. See Alison M. Konrad & Kathy Cannings, The Effects of Gender Role Congruence
and Statistical Discrimination on Managerial Advancement, 50 HUM. REL. 1305, 1318-19
(1997) (finding that men were rewarded more for long hours and penalized more than
women for their attention to household duties). Men also appear to be penalized more
than women for working part-time. See Ferber & Waldfogel, supra note 95, at 5.
183. Joseph Pleck argues: "For most men, taking ... leave is not part of their
conception of their role as father. Unlike mothers, fathers have not grown up believing
there is a special bond between themselves and their child that requires their being home
full-time during the first months of their child's life." Pleck, supra note 170, at 230. For
women who breastfeed their children, it makes sense for women to take more leave than
their husbands, assuming both are not able to be home together. Many women, however,
continue to breastfeed after they return to work, and men may also be able to arrange for
leave once the breastfeeding is completed.
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surround the issue of who takes leave to care for children, will be
critical to reducing workplace inequality further. In this Part, I will
explore the effects that the FMLA has had to date and argue that the
Act has made a minimal difference for working parents; indeed, I will
suggest that to the extent it has made a difference, it has reinforced
existing gender inequalities in the workplace. Given the experience
of other countries and states that offer more generous leave, I also
conclude that drastic measures will be necessary in order to prompt
men actually to take family leave and that moving to a system of paid
leave, by itself, would likely be a necessary but ultimately insufficient
condition to achieve that goal.
A. The Family Medical Leave Act
1. A Statutory Overview
The FMLA was passed in 1993 to great fanfare."8 The United
States was one of the last industrialized nations to adopt a leave law,
although, as discussed in more detail below, the American law is
among the least generous of any of such legislation. 85 As a symbolic
gesture, President Clinton signed the Act into law as his first official
legislative act, marking the end of a five-year effort to implement a
federal leave law, a process that included two vetoes by President
George Bush.86 I will contend, however, that despite the fanfare, the
legislation has failed to rise beyond the symbolic level.
The FMLA provides twelve weeks of unpaid leave to employees
working for employers having fifty or more employees. 87 In order to
be eligible for the leave, the employee must have worked for the
employer for at least one year and must have worked for that
employer at least 1250 hours during the previous twelve months.'1
Despite these restrictions, it is estimated that the Act covers
184. Upon passage, the bill received wide acclaim. See, e.g., Editorial, A Victory for
Families, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1993, at 2B; Carl Leubsdorf, Clinton Signs
Bill for Family Leave in Jubilant Ceremony, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 6, 1993, at
3A; Elizabeth Neuffer, Leave Bill OK'&L Clinton to Sign Today, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5,
1993, at 1; Paul Richter & Gebe Martinez, Clinton Signs Family Leave Bill into Law, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at A22; Janice Turner, U.S. Family Leave Plan Wins Praise in
Canada, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 6,1993, at Al.
185. See STEPHANiE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE 73 (1997) ("The United
States shares with South Africa the distinction of being the only two developed economies
without a national insurance program for families."); supra note 7.
186. For a thorough discussion of the road to passage, see RONALD D. ELVING,
CONFLICT & COMPROMISE: How CONGRESS MAKES THE LAW (1995).
187. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1994).
188. See id. § 2611(2)(A)(i).
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approximately 60% of the nation's private-sector workforce, even
though only about 11% of the nation's employers are covered.189
Public employers are also bound by the statutory provisions, bringing
the total number of covered employees to roughly 66% of the
workforce, with approximately 55% of employees statutorily eligible
to take leave.190
Under the terms of the statute, leave is available to an employee
to care for a newborn, for a newly adopted or foster child, and for
one's own serious illness, as well as to care for a seriously ill spouse,
parent, or child.19' The statute also provides for job protection in the
form of a guarantee that, at the end of the leave, the employee will be
returned to the same or to a substantially equivalent position, with
some limited exceptions.192 Importantly, the leave is unpaid, and the
employer can require that an employee utilize her accumulated
vacation or sick leave prior to taking the statutory leave to care for a
new child that has been brought into the family.193
2. The Effect of the FMLA
In order to assess the effect and importance of the F [LA, it is
necessary first to know what kind of leave was generally available
before the Act was passed. This task is made somewhat difficult
because, where provided, family leave was typically not offered
through formal "maternity leave" policies, but instead was afforded in
various other ways, such as through sick leave, disability policies, or
informal leave, thus making it difficult to know who had access to
what kind of leave.' 9 The federal government, however, periodically
189. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 11, at 58-61. Of the covered private-
sector employees, approximately 46.5% have met the statutory requirements rendering
them eligible to take leave. See id. at 61.
190. See id.
191. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
192. See id. § 2614(a)(1). The statute exempts from this requirement those who are
paid among the top 10% of the workforce if restoring them would cause "substantial and
grievous economic injury." Id. § 2614(b). It is also not necessary to restore a worker to a
position that would have been eliminated if the person had not been on leave. See id.
§ 2614(a)(1).
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A). Another important aspect of the legislation is that
an employer must continue to provide health benefits during the leave, which the
employee can be required to repay should the employee fail to return to work from her
leave. See id. § 2614(c).
194. For a discussion of the variety of plans, see Olivia S. Mitchell, Work and Family
Benefits, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 14, at 269,
270-71. Another reason that it was often difficult to assess the availability of leave is that
many of the studies were conducted by advocacy groups intent on influencing the
legislation. Not surprisingly, employer-sponsored studies tended to suggest inflated levels
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surveys employers to determine the kinds and forms of benefits they
provide to employees. These estimates suggest that a majority of
large employers, defined as those having more than 100 employees,
provided some form of leave before the passage of the FMLA to
enable women, but not necessarily men, to take time off around the
birth of a child. Paid sick leave was by far the most common form of
leave available, and unpaid maternity leave was also provided by a
substantial segment of employers. 1' 5  Nearly 90% of full-time
employees at large firms also had access to disability plans that
included coverage for pregnancy, 196 as did 96% of state and local
employees. 197 As the figures indicate, large employers were more
likely to offer leave than smaller employers, and professional
employees tended to have better access to leave than did clerical
employees. 98 Those who had worked for medium to large-size
employers for at least five years were estimated to have benefits that
averaged about nine weeks of available leave at full pay. 99
of coverage and provided what have proved to be grossly inflated estimates of the cost of
extending leave. Employee-sponsored studies, on the other hand, have indicated a paucity
of benefits and typically have underestimated the costs of additional leave legislation. For
example, in perhaps the most well-known study, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
estimated compliance with the FMLA would cost approximately $13 billion a year. See
Michelle Rose Marks, Party Politics and Family Policy: The Case of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 18 J. FAM. ISSUES 55, 59 (1997) (discussing the study and its
influence). An employee-sponsored survey, by contrast, found that there would be no
increase in cost for more than two-thirds of employers when it came to training, health
insurance, or unemployment insurance, and no administrative costs for more than half of
employers. See JOHN T. BOND ET AL., BEYOND THE PARENTAL LEAVE DEBATE: THE
IMPACT OF LAWS IN FOUR STATES at iii-iv (1991).
195. Some of the data are difficult to interpret because the study surveyed employers
of all sizes. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2459,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SURVEY: A BLS READER 3 (1995) (Sup. Docs. No. L 2.3:2459).
196. See Waldfogel, supra note 171, at 94 (citing government statistics).
197. See Christopher J. Ruhm, Policy Watch: The Family and Medical Leave Act, J.
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1997, at 175, 182.
198. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 133, at 2190 ("The smaller firms that are
not covered by the [FMLA] are the ones that are least likely to offer such benefits
currently."); Shelley M. MacDermid et al., Organizational Size and Work-Family Issues, in
THE EVOLVING WORLD OF WORK AND FAMILY: NEW STAKEHOLDERS, NEW VOICES
111, 120 (Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes & Bradley K. Googins eds., 1999) (noting that large
firms offer more benefits and are more willing to accommodate flexible work practices,
particularly for professional employees).
199. See Jutta M. Joesch, Paid Leave and the Timing of Women's Employment Before
and After Birth, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1008, 1009-10 (1997) (finding that 61 days of
paid leave were available for those who had at least five years of tenure with their
employer). For a discussion of the status of leave prior to the passage of the FMLA, see
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 2363, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS IN MEDIUM TO LARGE FIRMS, 1989, at 1-3 (1990) (Sup. Docs. No.
L 2.3/10:989).
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In addition to the availability of employer-provided leave, before
the FMLA was enacted, thirty-four states, Puerto Rico, and
Washington, D.C., had some type of leave legislation in place. The
state statutes varied in their provisions-some offered more generous
protection than was ultimately enacted by the FMLA, while others
offered less-and five states made some form of wage replacement
available through temporary disability insurance laws.2 A number
of studies sought to measure the extent to which the leave laws were
utilized, and all of the studies indicated very low utilization rates-
typically from 1% to 3% of employees used the leave annually.201
B. The FMLA in Action
1. The Use of the FMILA
Analyzing the pre-existing law in this detail helps expose the
limited benefits that the FMLA actually provides and places the law
in proper perspective. Recent data confirm that the FMLA provides
employees with little more than was previously available, with the
largely unintended exception of providing some additional unpaid
sick leave to employees. ° Although the statute is still relatively new,
the Commission on Family and Medical Leave commissioned two
comprehensive studies to determine the use and cost of the FMLA,
and those studies offer important and revealing insights into the
Act. °3  The surveys sought to determine how employers and
200. For a more detailed description of the law, see WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, STATE MATERNITY/FAMILY LEAVE LAW passim (1993) (Sup. Does. No.
L 36.102:L 48), and A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 11, at 44-49.
201. See EILEEN TRZCINSKI & WILLIAM T. ALPERT, LEAVE POLICIES IN SMALL
BUsINESS: FINDINGS FROM THE U.S. SMALL BusINEss ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEE
LEAVE SURVEY 54-55 (1990); Eileen Trzcinski & Matia Finn-Stevenson, A Response to
Arguments Against Mandated Parental Leave: Findings from the Connecticut Survey of
Parental Leave Policies, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 445,458 (1991).
202. See Suzanne M. Crampton & Jitendra M. Mishra, Family and Medical Leave
Legislation: Organizational Policies and Strategies, 24 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 271, 274-
75 (1995) (noting that "the number of companies with some type of leave policy already in
place prior to the passage of the FMLA has been estimated to be up to 89 percent");
Marks, supra note 194, at 65 (noting that "[t]he final bill demanded nothing more of most
businesses ... than what they provided already").
203. One survey concentrated on a random sample of private employers, while the
other sampled a random group of employees from both the public and private sector. The
Employer Survey, conducted by Westat, sampled a national, random group of employers,
interviewing respondents from 1206 worksites. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note
11, at 22-23. The Employee Survey, conducted by the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center, targeted employees aged 18 and over who lived in the United States and
had been employed for pay any time within the 18 months between January 1994 and
summer 1995, when the survey was conducted. See id. at 23-24.
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employees had responded to the passage of the Act, as well as
provide some measure as to its costs and benefits.
Both surveys found relatively low utilization rates of FMLA
benefits, levels that were consistent with previous studies. The
Employer Survey indicated that 3.6% of employees at covered
private-sector worksites took some form of FMLA leave, while the
Employee Survey found a utilization rate of 2 %.2(4 These numbers
represent those who took leave under the Act itself; a much larger
group of employees took leave for a reason covered by the FMLA,
but only a small fraction (7% in the Employee Survey) formally took
leave under the FMLA, as most employees continued to rely on other
forms of available leave, such as their sick leave or disability
insurance policies.0)5
The surveys also collected data concerning who took leave for
what reason. Women took significantly more leave than men (58.2%
compared to 41.8%), and the largest group of people taking leave fell
into the age group of thirty-five to forty-nine year olds.2°1 This latter
fact suggests that much of the leave probably was not related to the
birth or adoption of a child, a fact that was confirmed by the survey
results. Nearly 60% of those who took leave did so for their own
health-related problems, and only 17.1% of employees at covered
worksites took leave for reasons related to the birth or adoption of a
child.2°
The studies found no significant difference between men and
women in terms of the rate or length of parental leave,208 and the
median length of leave for all people taking leave was ten days,209
although there was substantial variance among the leave takers.
Approximately 75% of those who took leave returned within thirty-
five days, and about 13% of employees at covered sites took more
204. See id at 83. There is some indication that employer compliance with the FMLA
was limited immediately following its passage, which could have suppressed the number of
individuals who took leave. See Sue Shellenbarger, Many Employers Flout Family and
Medical Leave Law, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1994, at Bi (reporting that one study found that
up to 40% of employers failed to provide the required leave).
205. The Employee Survey found that 16.8% of employees surveyed took leave for a
reason covered by the FMLA, but only 7% of that group took leave under the FMLA.
See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 11, at 84.
206. See id. at 92.
207. See id. at 94-95. Somewhat ironically, the Employee Survey found a higher level
of leave related to childbirth or adoption in worksites that were not covered by the
FMLA, which accounted for approximately 22% of the FMLA-related leave. See id.
208. See id at 95-98.
209. See id. at 97.
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than twelve weeks of leave.2 10 Somewhat surprisingly, a significant
portion of FMLA leave to care for newborns lasted less than one
week, although leave defined as "maternity-leave" tended to last
substantially longer.21 There was also a small group of individuals
who indicated that they were unable to take FMLA leave despite
their need for the leave. Just under 4% of the surveyed employees
indicated that they needed leave but did not take it, with nearly two-
thirds of those employees indicating that they did not take leave
because they could not afford to do so.2 12
Finally, the surveys suggested that the costs of the FMLA to
employers appear to be quite modest. More than two-thirds of
employers covered their employees out on leave with other
employees, and the employees who were replaced by a permanent
hire tended to fall into the lowest income category.213 Significantly,
more employers indicated that the benefits of the Act, in terms of
increased productivity, outweighed whatever costs they incurred. 14
2. Evaluating the Effect of the Statute
Based on this early survey data, it appears that the FMLA has
had its greatest impact by allowing employees to take unpaid sick
leave for a limited time, leave that may not have been available
without the legislation. In some ways, this finding should come as
little surprise. As with respect to leave relating to the birth or
adoption of a child, the Act largely replicated what the market was
already providing-unpaid leave to those who worked for large
employers.2 15 Certainly there is no indication that the FMLA has
210. See id. The vast majority of employees returned to work following their leave,
while approximately 5.6% of all leave-takers failed to return. See id. at 113, fig.5.13.
211. Thirty-seven percent of non-covered employees who took leave to care for a
newborn returned to work within seven days. See id. at 97. In contrast, 42.4% of
maternity-disability leave lasted more than twelve weeks. See id. It is likely that the short
leaves were used in combination with other forms of available leave such as disability or
sick leave, so that the total length of leave was longer than indicated.
212. See id at 98-99. Significantly, less than 10% of the needed but untaken leave was
related to the birth or adoption of a child, as most of the untaken leave was to care for a
sick child or parent or for the respondent's own health problem. See id. at 99, fig.5.4.
213. See i&. at 102-03.
214. See id at 131, fig.6.4. Somewhat paradoxically, given the exemption for employers
with fewer than 50 employees, nearly twice as many larger employers reported moderate
or large cost effects than smaller employers. See id at 126.
215. See Marks, supra note 194, at 65 (noting that the bill offered little more than most
businesses provided); Ruhm, supra note 197, at 177 (finding that the FMLA offers limited
coverage). Ruth Colker recently lamented, that the "only solace [for low-income workers]
is that, if they work for a large employer, they, at least, will have a job to which they can
return after taking the most minimal possible medical leave." Ruth Colker, Pregnancy,
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greatly, or even mildly, facilitated the balancing of work and family
commitments, nor is there any evidence that it has induced men to
play a greater role at the birth or adoption of a child, especially given
how very short their leaves tend to be. The surveys also suggest that
most people who are taking substantial amounts of leave are doing so
under non-FMLA provided policies: nearly 50% of employees
reported receiving full wage replacement for the leave, while another
20% indicated receiving partial pay, neither of which is required by
the Act.216
Although the statute clearly has not improved the situation of
working parents to any substantial degree, the statute did offer an
important symbolic victory insofar as it represented the first federal
legislation addressing family leave. But symbolic legislation garners
little more than symbolic relief and may carry with it significant
negative effects.
One of the dangers associated with passing such a weak bill is
that once federal legislation is enacted, family leave legislation may
be removed from the agenda for state legislatures and unions, either
of which ultimately may have been more successful reformers. With
federal legislation in place, state legislatures, and to a lesser extent
unions, are likely to move on to other issues because interest group
pressure for leave legislation will have diminished significantly while
business opposition may have intensified. Indeed, this seems to have
occurred. Since the passage of the FMLA, no significant state
legislation has been enacted,21 7 and the only federal efforts have been
to expand the Act to include unpaid leave for such things as parent-
teacher meetings and efforts to extend the Act to smaller
employers.2 8 These are both worthy goals, but surely are limited in
their aspirations. To date, there has been no discussion of moving
toward guaranteeing paid leave."9
Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 61, 62 (1997).
216. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 11, at 107 (reporting that 46.7% of
employees reported receiving full wage replacement and 19.6% received partial pay).
217. A review of the Daily Labor Report's annual listings of all significant state labor
legislation enacted during the previous year indicates that there has been no significant
new legislation since at least 1993. Several states have amended their leave legislation to
permit parents to attend parent-teacher conferences, but even this rather limited
legislation has failed to pass in some states. See Rick Valliere, Maine Governor Vetoes
Minimum Wage Hike, Expanded Family Leave, Higher Comp Levels, Daily Lab. Rpt.
(BNA), June 17, 1999, at A-10 (describing the veto of legislation to allow parents 24 hours
to care for children or to attend parent-teacher conferences).
218. See Anya Bernstein, Inside or Outside? The Politics of Family and Medical Leave,
25 POL'Y STUD. J. 87, 97 (1997) (describing the proposals).
219. The President recently has suggested that states should be allowed to use
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The legislation may also have preempted the development of
more friendly policies in the private sector. Prior to the passage of
the FMLA, there appeared to be a modest trend by private employers
to provide increasingly generous paid leave policies, a trend that now
seems to have stalled as the federal legislation has become the ceiling
of benefits.22 The only positive note in the aftermath of the
legislation is that some unions appear to be seeking greater leave
benefits in their collective bargaining agreements and publicizing
their efforts as a way to attract new members. l
The early experience with the FMLA, as well as the substantial
limitations of the existing statute, shows that something more needs
to be done. This is especially true if the goal is to encourage more
men to take parental leave, a goal the current statute is inadequately
structured to address. In the next Part, I will discuss several ways in
which the statute might be amended in order to create more gender
equality in the workplace, although it will be important first to discuss
a proposal that has been offered to address the persistent inequities.
III. BRINGING EQUALITY TO THE WORKPLACE
Creating a successful national family leave policy remains the
key to reducing workplace inequality for women. There are a
number of ways in which the Act might be amended to break up the
gendered divisions that continue to demarcate both work and home
lives. Before discussing these proposals, however, I want to spend
some time analyzing a recent tax reform proposal that is primarily
intended to address the same problem I have been discussing in this
Article-namely, the persistence of gender inequality in the
unemployment surpluses to subsidize family leave. See Diane E-. Lewis, Clinton Starts
Program for Parental Paid Leave, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al. This idea would
provide some wage replacement, though only at the levels currently available for the
unemployed, and would likely provide some benefit to those who currently do not have
access to paid leave. See id. The proposal was met with initial hostility by the business
community, and it remains unclear whether the Department of Labor and the states will
implement the proposal. See Julie Kosterlitz, A Fistfight over Family Paid Leave, 1999
NAT'LJ., 3545,3545.
220. It is easy to see how this preclusive effect can occur. Employers tend to offer
generous benefits as a way of attracting employees and maintaining a competitive edge in
the labor market. Once the law creates a federal right and employees grow to expect that
right, employers may be less likely to use leave as a means to attract employees. Better
data will be necessary, however, before we can determine whether this is what in fact has
occurred.
221. The AFL-CIO, for example, includes a section on its web page announcing
successes in bargaining for greater leave than required by federal law. See AFL-CIO,
Bargaining to Expand the Family and Medical Leave Act (visited Jan. 17, 2000)
<http://www.aflcio.org/women/fnla.htm>.
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workplace.
A. The Idea of Tax Reform
It is often suggested that it is economically rational for women to
leave the labor force when they have children and that economic
considerations primarily determine that decisionPm In his recent
book, Taxing Women, Edward McCaffery argues that women leave
the workforce because the tax system, along with their lower incomes
relative to men's, compels them to forgo their market wage in order
to care for their children.P His primary concern is with the system of
joint tax filing and its penalties on secondary income earners, a
phenomenon that disproportionately affects women given that
women still tend to earn less than their husbands. 4  McCaffery
therefore proposes that the tax system be restructured to tax married
women at a lower rate in order to create sufficient incentives to
encourage more women to enter, or remain in, the labor force.P
This restructuring is an intriguing idea, and McCaffery deserves
much credit for having sparked a lively debate regarding the
gendered nature of the tax system.z 6 It is uncertain, however, that his
proposal would produce the results he suggests for at least two
reasons. First, his theory is premised on a weak empirical foundation.
The essence of McCaffery's argument is that women's labor force
attachment is quite elastic relative to wages, whereas men's
attachment is inelastic; however, he bases both of his assumptions on
several older studies?2 7 More recent empirical work casts doubt on
these critical assumptions, as it appears that the elasticity of women's
labor force attachment is increasingly becoming more like men's.M
222. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
223. MCCAFFERY, supra note 140, at 148-49. McCaffery's book is primarily based on
two articles that previously appeared in law reviews, McCaffery, supra note 133, and
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993).
224. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 140, at 137-60,178-84.
225. See iL at 277-80.
226. For recent commentaries on McCaffery's argument, see Anne L. Alstott, Tax
Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
2001, 2018-19, 2033-42 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1997) (reviewing TAXING WOMEN, supra note 140).
227. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 140, at 179-82. Most of the studies McCaffery relies
on interpret data from the mid-1980s or earlier. See id.
228. For example, in their study of working women, Klerman and Leibowitz concluded
that higher wages did not increase the number of women who returned to work. The
authors concluded that "[t]here is little support for the hypothesis that higher wages
induce women to return to work sooner after giving birth than do lower wages." Klerman
& Leibowitz, supra note 89, at 289. The authors did find that women earning higher wages
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Recent data also indicate that women whose husbands have high
incomes are entering the workforce at a faster rate than those with
husbands at the bottom of the scale, a fact that is difficult to reconcile
with McCaffery's theory. 9
Second, McCaffery fails to provide supporting data for his
argument that it is cost effective for women to stay at home to care
for their children. Taxes unquestionably eat away at secondary
incomes, but it would make financial sense for women to leave the
workforce only if their net pay were so low that it either did not cover
child care expenses or did not overcome the worker's preference for
staying home. Neither assumption has been established empirically.
Jane Waldfogel has calculated that childcare costs average
approximately 22% of female earnings, leaving substantial income
even after accounting for taxes.230 McCaffery likely would respond by
suggesting that the elasticity of women's decisions to work means that
the decisions are not entirely determined by the economic feasibility
of staying home, but again, without more support for the underlying
claim of elasticity, this response fails to overcome the empirical
objections.
were more likely to be on leave, although that leave was also likely to be unpaid. See id. at
294. Another recent study found that the elasticity of women's workforce attachment is
much lower than originally had been documented and depends greatly upon the presence
and number of children as well as the education level of the woman. See Juhn & Murphy,
supra note 25, at 86-92; see also Alstott, supra note 226, at 2018-19 (critiquing studies
concluding that increased female labor supply is a response to increased wages).
229. See ROBERT MAX JACKSON, DESTINED FOR EQUALITY: THE INEViTABLE RISE
OF WOMEN'S STATUS 97 (1998) ("The primary trend of wives joining the work force has
been overwhelmingly independent of husband's economic status."); Maria Cancian et al.,
Working Wives and Family Income Inequality Among Married Couples, in UNEVEN
TIDES: RISING INEQUALrrY IN AMERICA, supra note 30, 198, 199 tbl.6.1 (noting that
between 1968 and 1988 the largest group of white women entering the workforce were
those married to high income men); Juhn & Murphy, supra note 25, at 85 (finding that
women's employment increased most dramatically at upper income ranges). Relatedly,
one study on the effects of child care costs found that higher costs actually decreased the
chances a woman would quit her job because those who paid the most for child care had
the best paying jobs. See Jennifer L. Glass & Sarah Beth Estes, Workplace Support, Child
Care, and Turnover Intentions Among Employed Mothers of Infants, 17 J. FAM. ISSUES
317, 327 (1996).
230. See Waldfogel, supra note 7, at 141 tbl.2. Amy Christian has suggested that a
woman earning $30,000 likely would have a net loss of income when expenses are
accounted for, suggesting that it is economically rational for most women to remain at
home. See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing
the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 291-93 (1997). Christian's costs
estimates, however, appear to be grossly inflated calculations that she never actually seeks
to document. More to the point, Christian's argument is plainly refuted by the presence of
millions of working mothers who earn less than $30,000, surely an indication that they are
not losing money by working.
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Additionally, embedded within McCaffery's analysis is the vice
identified earlier, namely that the choice to sacrifice a woman's
income is economically rational and should be treated as such. It is
important to highlight again the circularity of this position: the
primary reason a woman's income is lower than a man's is that she is
expected to leave the workforce to care for children and fulfilling that
expectation is the best way to ensure that gender income inequality
persists. Even if the strategy makes sense on an individual family
level, it may reduce our social welfare by suppressing the wages of
women, which may provide a strong argument for governmental
action to alter the existing patterns. Indeed, changing the work
patterns of men would seem preferable to adopting the controversial,
and constitutionally suspect,"' change in the tax code, particularly
given the empirical limitations of the theory.
B. Fixing the FMLA with an Eye on Equality
In this Section, I want to discuss several ways in which the
FMLA might be altered so as to alleviate some of the workplace
disadvantage women continue to experience and to help change the
governing norms. Rather than provide detailed policy proposals, I
want to treat this Section as more tentative and exploratory-as a
way of beginning a conversation. This approach seems to make sense
not only because some of the proposals have little chance of being
adopted in the near future, but also because amending the FMLA
should be seen as only one facet of a more comprehensive reform
strategy. Surely at this stage of our experience, it would be foolish to
think there is any single or easy fix to what is an enormously
complicated and deep-seated problem. That said, concentrating on
family leave seems to be the most promising current strategy.
1. The Need for Paid Leave
There are various ways in which a more equitable family leave
system might be devised, all of which will require some form of paid
leave. Ideally, the twelve weeks of currently mandated unpaid leave
would be transformed into paid leave, but if that proves infeasible, at
least in the short term, then a minimum of six weeks of paid leave for
231. It is somewhat surprising that neither McCaffery nor those who have commented
on his proposal discuss its constitutionality. Creating an explicitly gendered tax system
would certainly be subject to a constitutional challenge that would have to meet the
intermediate level of scrutiny. As I discuss below, I believe an argument can be made
supporting the constitutionality of a similar program, but it is not something that ought to
be assumed. See infra notes 246-47.
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men and women following the birth or adoption of the child should
be made available. As a way of equalizing leave-taking to some
degree, it should be mandated that the leave be taken in its entirety
or not at all. In other words, a parent would have to take the full six
weeks in order to receive any paid leave, and the leave would belong
exclusively to one parent without the possibility of sharing the leave
between parents 32 If this policy were adopted, consistent with the
existing 12-week mandate, an additional six weeks of unpaid leave
also should be made available to parents.
Providing six weeks of paid leave should induce some fathers to
take parental leave, perhaps as many as 20%.11 Additionally, and not
insignificantly, it may help settle the question of whether men actually
want to be involved more directly in child rearing by undercutting
their current excuses for not taking leave.34 With paid leave in place,
men's work situation would be much like that currently confronted by
women. To the extent they suffer adverse effects, they would have
recourse under the remedial provisions of the FMLA3 5
Although providing paid leave for longer periods of time would
certainly aid those women trying to balance work and family issues,
there is little reason to believe such legislation by itself would reduce
the inequality women face in the workplace.36 Even with paid leave
legislation, it is unlikely that substantial numbers of men will take the
232. A number of countries have allowed parents to share a specified amount of leave,
but when they do so mothers utilize the vast majority of the leave time. See SANDRA
FRIEDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW 219-20 (1997) (discussing the disparity between the
proportion of leave taken by mothers as compared to fathers).
233. This percentage seems to be an upward estimate based on experiences within
Swedish and American companies where leave has been encouraged. Maim seems to
suggest that the numbers could be even higher, though his rationalizations for why men do
not currently take leave accumulate to a point beyond credulity. It seems incredible, for
example, that men may need to avail themselves of sexual harassment doctrine, as Malin
suggests, to counter the hostile work environments that confront men who try to take
leave as. See Malin, supra note 174, at 1089-94 (arguing that sexual harassment law would
provide a remedy for men who work in a "FMLA hostile environment").
234. See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
235. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (1994) (setting forth remedies for violation of the FMLA).
236. This pervasive inequality is one reason why the proposal by Samuel Issacharoff
and Elyse Rosenblum to provide for a payroll tax to pay for family leave fails to go far
enough. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 133, at 2214-20. Their model for
funding 12 weeks of pregnancy leave is based on the Canadian model and borrows
substantially from unemployment insurance schemes. See id at 2216-17. This model is
likely to reduce the gender gap somewhat, however, by making it easier for women to
return to work after having a child, thereby creating a more continuous work career. See
id at 2164 (emphasizing the importance of continuous labor force attachment); see also
Waldfogel, supra note 7, at 151-52 (arguing that providing leave coverage to women might
reduce the pay gap associated with having children by 40%).
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guaranteed level, particularly if they have accrued vacation time that
would satisfy their apparent preference for a short leave time.
Experiences from countries that offer more generous leave policies
demonstrate that men remain reluctant to take leave even when the
leave is paid. With the important, and partial, exception of Sweden,
discussed below, men rarely avail themselves of leave,2 7 and even in
Sweden the leave legislation has brought fewer benefits than is often
assumed.
Sweden is widely cited as having a model leave law, and one that
has achieved some success in getting men to take leaveP 8 Based on
data from the late 1980s, approximately 44% of Swedish men take
parental leave with the average leave lasting forty-five days. 39
Although these figures are impressive relative to other nations, it is
nevertheless important to place them in context. Nearly all Swedish
women take leave, and their leave averages 260 days, nearly nine
months, or six times as long as men's leave 4 In addition to the
unequal lengths of leave, most Swedish mothers work part-time, at
least on their initial return from work. Women with children in the
United States are twice as likely to work full-time as similarly situated
women in Sweden.24 Women in Sweden also remain largely absent
from managerial positions despite their family leave policies.242
237. As noted previously, men generally take about five days of leave, even though
many men have access to some form of paid leave. See supra text accompanying note 170
and sources cited therein. Based upon a survey of leave patterns in the United States and
Sweden, Joseph Pleck concludes: "[F]or whatever reason, it is clear that fathers will take
advantage of infant care leave to a far lesser extent than mothers. Infant-care leave
policies may be gender-neutral in principle but they will not work in a gender-neutral way
in practice." Joseph H. Pleck, Fathers and Infant Care Leave, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE
CRISIS 188 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1988).
238. For discussions of Sweden's experience as a possible model for the United States,
see Siv Gustafsson & Frank P. Stafford, Three Regimes of Child Care: The United States,
the Netherlands, and Sweden, in SOCIAL PROTECTION VERSUS ECONOMIC FLEXIBILITY:
Is THERE A TRADE-OFF? 333, 346-47 (Rebecca M. Blank ed., 1994); LINDA HAAS,
EQUAL PARENTHOOD & SOCIAL POLICY: A STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVE IN SWEDEN
187-215 (1992); Malin, supra note 174, at 1075-77; Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The
Myth of Unpaid Leave: Can the United States Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based on the
Swedish Model? 17 COmP. LAB. L.J. 373,374-80 (1996).
239. See Joseph P. Allen, European Infant Care Leaves: Foreign Perspectives on the
Integration of Work and Family Roles, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS, supra note 237,
at 264; Linda Haas, Nurturing Fathers and Working Mothers: Changing Gender Roles in
Sweden, in MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY, supra note 170, at 238, 248-49; Grill, supra note
238, at 377-78.
240. See Haas, supra note 239, at 249. The figures Haas cite are for children born in
1989.
241. See Gustafsson & Stafford, supra note 238, at 348.
242. See Dana Milbank, Sweden: Laws Help Mom, but They Hurt Her Career, WALL
ST. J., July 26, 1995, at B1 ("Women hold only 8% of private-sector managerial jobs, and
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Sweden, however, remains an important case study, if for no
other reason than the successful way in which the country has been
able to incorporate family leave and child care into the typical
employment package.2 43 Within Sweden, there is widespread political
support for extended parental leave and publicly financed daycare
facilities, both of which have been accepted as part of the
comprehensive protection policies that characterize the Swedish
social welfare system.244 The Swedish model may not translate
directly to the United States, but it does seem clear that any
successful family leave program will require broad-based political
support, something that appears to exist in the United States, though
the policies we have implemented fall short of creating an adequate
policy.245
2. Requiring Men to Take Leave
Given the limited effect a paid leave policy probably would have
on inducing men to take more leave, it will be necessary to take
stronger measures, and I will discuss two such proposals here. One
proposal would be to require men to take six weeks of leave, which
could be done on a temporary basis-say for five years-as a means
of changing the structured patterns that continue to replicate our
gender inequalities through the preservation of gender norms.
Although the notion of forced leave may sound rather extreme, the
underlying premise of the idea is that currently women are effectively
required to take leave, and this proposal simply would balance that
socially imposed condition with one that was legally imposed.
There are two strong arguments in favor of a mandatory leave
policy. First, if properly enforced, such a system in all likelihood
would succeed and may strongly influence the prevailing norms
they are all but absent from top management.").
243., For example, a Swedish banker commented that the leaves are "'good for the
fathers and mothers, and that must be good for the bank.'" Allen, supra note 239, at 255
(citation omitted).
244. See Gustafsson & Stafford, supra note 238, at 346.
245. It is an interesting question why our policies are so inadequate despite the broad-
based political support for improving the lives of working families. I think the best
explanation is one noted earlier, namely that as a society we remain largely ambivalent
regarding women working outside of the home, so the political support may not be as
great as indicated by the polls. See, e.g., supra note 5 (citing a poll showing that many
Americans want to return to the gender roles of the 1950s). Additionally, providing a
stronger family leave policy meets strong resistance from the business commiunity, which
opposes most government mandates. When these forces conflict, governmental bodies
increasingly are deferring to the interests of the business community. For a discussion
along these lines, see JOEL BLAU, ILLUSIONS OF PROSPERITY 1-21 (1999).
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regarding working parents because both men and women would be
expected to leave the workplace for a definite period of time
following the birth or adoption of a child. This change should sharply
reduce the incentives to engage in statistical discrimination and also
may help reduce some of the human capital disparities that are tied to
the expectations surrounding childbirth. Second, on a purely
pragmatic level, it may be the only policy that effectively would
encourage large numbers of men to take leave.
Despite its possible success, the objections to a mandatory
patdrnity leave policy would almost certainly block its
implementation. As a legal matter, questions would arise regarding
the law's constitutionality on both due process and equal protection
grounds. Although I believe that a well-developed program could
survive constitutional scrutiny 6 a gender-neutral proposal would
garner greater support with nearly identical results. Because most, if
not all, women would take the available paid leave, requiring such
leave of both men and women would ameliorate the constitutional
concerns while affecting the choices of very few women.247 This kind
246. Without going into detail, I will sketch an argument that a gender-specific
requirement that men take leave would be constitutional (which is, of course, quite
different from saying that the Supreme Court would uphold such a policy). Gender-based
restrictions need only satisfy the Court's intermediate scrutiny, which requires establishing
that the program was designed to serve an important governmental objective and that the
chosen means were substantially related to the achievement of that objective. See
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). In the area of gender
classification, one of the Court's central concerns is that the legislation not perpetuate
gender stereotypes. See id. at 725. Requiring men to take leave could run afoul of the
Court's concern with gender stereotypes; however, in this instance the act is based on an
empirical, and well-documented, reality rather than a stereotype, namely that men rarely
take leave and that the gendered nature of leave-taking substantially contributes to labor
market inequality. The harm that women suffer as a result of the existing patterns is also
well documented, and both of these facts should lend credence to the government's claim
that the legislation is aimed at advancing an important governmental interest-gender
equality. Similarly, it should be possible to establish that mandatory leave is the only
means possible to break up the patterns, and if the statute includes a defined time period,
the Court should be even more receptive to upholding the provision as a temporary
measure aimed at correcting a manifest imbalance in the workplace. Cf. Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987) (upholding a gender preference to
remedy a manifest imbalance in the workplace). Let me reiterate that this footnote simply
provides a brief and by no means conclusive or persuasive explication of what is a
complicated and, by necessity, nuanced argument.
247. A gender-neutral policy still must satisfy the Court's rational basis scrutiny, but
given that the policy would be intended to serve the important goal of reducing gender
inequality, this level of scrutiny should not be a difficult standard to meet. Similarly,
whatever liberty concerns might arise should be mitigated by the realization that large
numbers of workers-truck drivers and airline pilots for example-are prevented from
working for specific periods. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 121.481(c) (1999) (mandating rest
periods for pilots who fly more than eight hours in a 24-hour period); 49 C.F.R. § 395.3
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of a gender-neutral proposal may, however, harken to the days when
pregnant women were often required to leave the workplace both
before and after giving birth2" and, for this reason, may prove
politically undesirable. There are also important questions regarding
the proposal's administrability, in particular whether the statute
would apply to all fathers, to only those who are married to the
mother, or to those who are living at home with the mother. For
these reasons, a mandatory leave policy is unlikely to garner sufficient
support, and it will be important to consider additional, less drastic
means to get men to take more leave.
3. Creating a Set-Aside Program for Family Leave
I believe the most promising of the less drastic measures would
be to tie federal contracts to employers' records regarding the
utilization rates of their parental leave policies. Employers with a
strong record of men taking leave, a record that exceeds industry
standards, might be incorporated into the existing government
programs for providing contracts to disadvantaged businesses.24 9 As
noted earlier, any such program could be structured in a gender-
neutral fashion so as to avoid some, but not all, legal challenges.
Along these lines, participation in the set-aside program could be
triggered when a specified percentage of male and female employees
have availed themselves of the paid leave programs. An employer
would be certified to participate in the program after 50% of its
eligible male and female employees had taken at least six weeks of
leave, and the employer's continued participation would be tied to
maintaining a specified level of leave-taking1 0  Again, because
(1998) (limiting the number of consecutive hours commercial motor vehicle drivers can
work). If men were required to take leave, they could not be required to engage in any
particular activities, such as child care, but would instead be free to do whatever they
pleased other than work for their employers.
248. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 138-43 (1977) (striking down a
requirement that women about to give birth take leaves of indeterminate lengths);
Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974) (striking down a
requirement that women take leave five months before an expected birth and for at least
three months after).
249. The federal government currently has a number of contract set-aside programs in
place. The Small Business Administration administers the program known as Section
8(a), which promotes government contracting with minority businesses. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 644 (West 1999). For a comprehensive overview of federal affirmative action programs,
including various set-aside programs, see GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS & CHRISTOPHER
EDLEY, JR., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW:
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1995) (Sup. Does. No. PREX 1.2:98015717), available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OP/htnil/aa/aa-index.html>.
250. If this kind of program were implemented, an employer would submit
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women are likely to satisfy the requirement for paid leave, the
gender-neutral standard effectively would be triggered by the
participation of the male employeesl 5' To avoid crowding out
minority and other contractors who currently participate in the
contract programs, either a separate family leave set-aside could be
created, or the goals that currently exist could be increased so as to
accommodate the new bidders.
Rather than creating an explicit set-aside program, an alternative
approach would be for the government to require employers to
provide paid leave to their employees and ensure that a minimum of
50% of their eligible male and female employees take the leave in
order to qualify for federal contracts of a certain size. This program
would resemble the existing Executive Order program that requires
government contractors who receive contracts in excess of $50,000 to
implement affirmative action programs2 2  Local and state
governments could also tie their contracts to similar programs, as is
occurring increasingly for a variety of causes ranging from domestic
partner benefits to requirements that employers provide a so-called
"living wage" to their employees. 3
It is difficult to know just how much a set-aside program might
work to reduce inequality and alter gender norms. Currently, the
government awards billions of dollars annually to disadvantaged
businesses through various contracting programs,2 and most studies
documentation showing what percentage of its employees were eligible for the leave, the
number who took the leave, and the length of the leave. The employer would then have
to submit annual reports indicating that it has maintained sufficient participation in its
leave program. This requirement would be similar to the continuing certification
requirements under the Small Business Administration programs.
251. A skeptical court might view such a program as a pretext for sex discrimination, in
which case the program may have to be justified along the lines suggested in supra notes
246-47.
252. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (providing that contractors with 50 or more employees and
contracts of $50,000 or more must implement affirmative action programs).
253. San Francisco requires its contractors to provide benefits to domestic partners.
See Carla Marinucci, S.F. s New Partners Law Called Rousing Success, S.F. CHRON. (Bay
Area ed.), Jan. 7, 1998, at A13. In the last several years, a number of jurisdictions have
required their contractors to provide a living wage; it is now estimated that two dozen
cities have enacted such laws, with many more currently considering the idea. See, e.g.,
Ron DePasquale, Council Unanimously Approves Living-Wage Measures, BUFF. NEWS,
July 28, 1999, at 5B; Sarah Fishman, A Living Wage Takes Effect in Somerville, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 25, 1999, at 17; Nicholas Riccardi, 'Living Wage' Law OK'd by County
Supervisors, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at 1; Scott Wilson, Compromise Living-Wage Bill
Offered in Montgomery, WASH. POST, July 21, 1999, at B4.
254. See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify
Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1590-94 (1998). Under the Small
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indicate that the existing programs have significantly increased
opportunities for women and minority contractors.P5  Perhaps of
equal importance, these programs have become an integral part of
the debate on racial and, to a lesser extent, gender equality and are
now largely enmeshed as part of our government procurement
process. 56 Including family leave as part of that national dialogue
would serve important political interests and might help us rethink
existing policies that place the onus of child rearing on women.
7
Another significant advantage of a set-aside program is that such a
program places the incentive with employers to encourage their
employees to take leave, rather than relying on employees to take
action. As a result, employers would be far less likely to penalize
their employees for taking leave because they will stand to benefit
from the policy, and consequently men no longer would fear that they
would be ostracized or penalized if they took their available leave.
With this in mind, inducing substantial numbers of men to take
parental leave through a set-aside policy would have at least three
important salutary effects. First, it would inject noise into the signal
employers currently use to discriminate against women based on their
Business Administration's Section 8(a) Minority Enterprise Development Program, for
example, more than $6 billion is awarded annually to participating firms. See OFFICE OF
MINORITY ENTER. DEV., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
MINORITY SMALL BUSINESS AND CAPIrAL OWNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1997, at 26 (1998).
255. See BARBARA F. RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACrION IN
EMPLOYMENT 59 (1998); Ayres & Vars, supra note 254, at 1592 (noting that "MBEs were
actually 33 percent more likely to sell to the government than were nonminority firms");
John Lunn & Huey L. Perry, Justifying Affirmative Action: Highway Construction in
Louisiana, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 464, 475 (1993) (finding that a federal
requirement to include DBEs in highway construction contracts increased the number of
minority and women-owned firms working on federally funded, as compared to state-
funded, projects in Louisiana); Samuel L. Myers, Jr. & Tsze Chan, Who Benefits from
Minority Business Set-Asides? The Case of New Jersey, 15 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
202,215 (1996) (finding that both the number of bids submitted and the contracts awarded
increased significantly with set-asides but that success rates did not increase); William M.
Rodgers III & William E. Spriggs, The Effect of Federal Contractor Status on Racial
Differences in Establishment-Level Employment Shares: 1979-1992, 86 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PROC. 290, 292 (1996) (finding that federal contractors increased hiring of
African Americans).
256. Indeed, even though the set-aside programs have been under attack by a hostile
Congress for a number of years, efforts to repeal the programs have been unsuccessful.
See, e.g., James Dao, Senate Stops Bid to End Road-Work Set-Asides, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1998, at A9 (noting that the "Senate strongly rejected an effort today to end a two-decade
old program").
257. To some extent, family leave is already part of the national dialogue, and creating
a set-aside program might add to its importance and relevance rather than introducing the
issue into our national discourse.
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projected labor force attachment, thereby making the signal even less
accurate and presumably less valuable for employers. Once men
begin to take leave, employers would no longer be able to assume
that women would bring a disadvantage to the labor force that
distinguishes them from men. This result is, in large measure, what
occurred during the litigation over fetal protection policies in which
companies sought to restrict their female, but not their male
employees, from jobs where they would be exposed to high levels of
lead, even though both men and women were being exposed to
harmful levels in the workplace. When the Supreme Court struck
down those policies as a form of gender discrimination, employers
had a far stronger incentive to reduce lead levels for all of their
employees because the relatively easy option of excluding women was
no longer available5 8 But such an effect can only occur if substantial,
rather than token, numbers of men begin to take leave.
Relatedly, once more men begin to take leave, it may be possible
to create a greater coalition for incorporating family leave into the
workplace package of benefits. A primary reason that family leave
remains a secondary, or tertiary, workplace benefit is that it generally
concerns only women, and most employers do not feel a need to
change their policies to attract more workers.259 If men began to take
leave at levels that were commensurate with their stated interest, the
issue would begin to affect all workers rather than just female
workers, and then we might see family leave become part of the
standard package of benefits, just like health insurance or workers'
compensation. This is, in fact, the process that led to the adoption of
workers' compensation legislation, which arose at the turn of the
century as a result of the emergence of a broad confluence of interests
between workers and employers.2  Incorporating family leave
policies into the standard benefits package is likely to occur only
when employers realize that the costs of allowing workers to take
258. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211
(1991). For a recent discussion of the case and the important role the union played, see
DRUCILLA CORNELL, AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX, AND EQUALITY
71-81 (1998).
259. See Rhode, supra note 139, at 592 ("As long as work and family conflicts remain
primarily 'women's' issues, they are unlikely to receive adequate attention in
decisionmaking structures dominated by men."); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 73-
75 (discussing employers' resistance to adopting family friendly policies).
260. See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers'
Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 330 (1998) (arguing
that workers' compensation legislation succeeded where other progressive legislation
failed because it received support from a broad range of interest groups).
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leave are not as high as perceived and offer significant returns in
loyalty and productivity.26' This information, however, can be
provided only through experimentation, which will require broader
use of leave by both men and women.
Finally, and in some ways most importantly, the set-aside
proposal effectively treats women, or more accurately the taking of
leave at the time of the birth of a child, as the norm. Rather than
requiring women to act like men as a means of moving toward
equality, the idea advanced here requires men to act more like
women and thereby seeks to alter our workplace expectations so that
employers will expect their employees to take significant leave
following the birth or adoption of a child. Taking this step forward
may go a long way toward dissecting our existing gender norms and
reducing some of the inequality that currently results from
perceptions that are not supported by the data.262 Along the same
lines, changing the norms should help us move to a day when we no
longer talk about female and male employees or their distinct work
patterns, but instead can move to a less gendered work sphere.
Requiring employers to provide six weeks of paid leave likely
would be met by vigorous opposition by employers and their
representative groups, who would object to the potential costs of such
a mandate.2 63 The costs of the proposal should not be ruinous,
however, and quite possibly would not be even all that substantial.
Currently, many employers provide forms of paid leave through other
existing policies, such as sick leave and vacation time, and most
261. Although the data on the productivity gains from paid family leave policies are
limited, many have argued that such policies will ultimately enhance worker productivity.
See, e.g., WEVER, supra note 7, at 18 (arguing that paid leave reduces "employee turnover
and absenteeism rates"); WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 92-94 (suggesting flexible work
practices will increase productivity). The inertia described earlier coupled with the lack of
good information currently may prevent more employers from adopting policies, and
mandating the leave may expedite the development of efficient policies. Cf. John J.
Donohue, III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1427 (1986) (arguing that
antidiscrimination laws decrease profits of discriminators faster than the market).
262. Nancy Fraser has sought to create a similar model that combines the best features
of the competing equality and difference models. Fraser concludes: "The key to achieving
gender equity in a postindustrial welfare state... is to make women's current life-patterns
the norm for everyone." FRASER, supra note 19, at 61. For a similar argument regarding
the development of sexual harassment law, see generally Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183
(1989).
263. The early versions of what ultimately became the FMLA contained provisions for
wage replacement, but these provisions quickly were dropped in the face of strong
business opposition. See Marks, supra note 194, at 59-60 (discussing the early history of
the FMLA and its opposition by business leaders).
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women take advantage of whatever leave is available to them. For
these employers, a mandated paid leave provision simply would shift
women's leave-taking from one category to another, with the
additional costs arising from the increased numbers of men who
would take leave 64 It has been estimated that California's mandate
to fund pregnancy leave through its disability insurance program
added about 20% to the costs of that system 65 Even assuming a
higher cost, say doubling the cost of disability insurance, the burden
would still fall below that currently required by workers'
compensation, as disability insurance is currently one of the lowest
cost benefits offered by employers 66
Some portion of the costs of implementing paid leave arguably
would be passed onto employees in the form of lower wages. 267
Although this cost shifting may appear to be a significant
disadvantage to the proposal, this effect is not unique to family leave
but is equally true for other workplace benefits, such as workers'
compensation or health insurance.2s6 A significant advantage of a set-
264. Any legitimate concern about increased costs could be met by amending the
FMLA so that sick leave could be used on a discretionary basis for the six weeks of paid
leave. Even under the existing law, employers have flexibility to require their employees
to take various forms of leave before they utilize the unpaid leave provided by the FMLA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d) (1994).
265. See WEVER, supra note 7, at 14.
266. The United States Department of Labor reports that in 1996 short-term and long-
term disability combined accounted for approximately .3% of compensation costs. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, 1986-98, at 9 tbl.1 (1998) (Sup. Docs. No. L 2.120/2-13). In
contrast, health benefits accounted for 5.8% of compensation, and vacation pay totaled
3.0% of compensation. See icL
267. This was the finding of Jonathan Gruber's study of the effects of state mandates
requiring the coverage of childbirth expenses in employer-provided insurance. See
Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622,
639 (1994). Others estimate that there only will be a small effect on wages as a result of
family leave mandates. See Waldfogel, supra note 7, at 152 & n.17 (discussing studies).
For additional discussions, see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules:
Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 389 (1991)
(discussing the effects of mandatory product warranties for consumers); Jonathan Gruber
& Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons
from Workers' Compensation Insurance, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111, 112(David Bradford ed., 1991) (concluding that employers shift workers' compensation costs
to employees through lower wages, but that the costs only negligibly affect employment
rates); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1492 (1998) (relying on the endowment effect to explain the ability to pass the
costs onto employees); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated
Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 177, 180-81 (1989) (concluding that
mandated benefits should be valued as the difference between the employer's cost of
furnishing the benefit and the value of the benefit to the employee).
268. Gruber and Krueger estimate that 85% of the cost of workers' compensation
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aside program is that the costs are likely to be absorbed primarily by
the government and, thus, shared more broadly by its citizens.
But given that there is nothing unique about the costs of family
leave, the proper question is whether these costs are a tradeoff we are
willing to make in order to reduce gender inequality in the workplace.
As previously noted, the survey data suggest that workers strongly
support paid leave provisions. 9 Even if that were not the case, as a
society we need to make a judgment regarding the importance of
incorporating family leave into the standard package of benefits
offered to employees 7 After all, many employees likely would
express a willingness to work in hazardous conditions for greater pay,
yet the workplace is closely regulated to reduce those hazards despite
the effect the regulations have on labor demand. Accordingly, we
need to get beyond the notion that only costless programs are
politically feasible; as we saw in the discussion of the FMLA, costless
programs generally provide commensurate benefits. If we are
interested in improving the equality of women in the workplace, then
the costs of a set-aside program or of requiring men to take leave will
be well worth the costs and in the long run will offer far more in
return.
CONCLUSION
At some point, something is going to have to give: either women
are going to have to give up the hope of true workplace equality and
relegate themselves to the position of secondary status within the
workplace, or we will need to develop policies that relieve the existing
penalty imposed on women in connection with having children.
Improving women's human capital or trying to change women's
employment behavior in other ways is unlikely to lead to greater
progress; something more is needed. In this Article, I have argued
insurance was borne by workers and that the cost borne by employers likely reduced
employment by .11%, or a little more than 100,000 jobs for the 90 million workers
covered. See Gruber & Krueger, supra note 267, at 134. A recent study of Hawaii's
legislation mandating that employers provide health insurance found that much of the cost
of the program was passed on to workers in the form of lower wages, but that there was no
apparent suppression of labor demand. See Norman K. Thurston, Labor Market Effects of
Hawaii's Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
117,130 (1997).
269. See National Partnership for Women and Families, supra note 12, at tbl.7.
270. This phenomenon appears to have occurred in other countries. For example,
when asked about the costs of the extended leave mandated in Germany, one employer
noted: "[W]e don't think about it[;] your question is like asking how we feel about
workers receiving Sunday as a day off." Allen, supra note 239, at 257.
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that we should find ways to encourage men to take leave surrounding
the birth of a child and that we should do so by providing a minimum
of six weeks of paid leave and by creating a contract set-aside
program that would reward employers for encouraging their
employees to take family leave. Making these changes would be only
a start on the road to greater equality, but it would be an important
step-indeed I believe the most important step-we could make
toward greater workplace equality. This proposal would be well
worth the costs, particularly given that the costs of our current
system-in reduced opportunities and persistent gender inequality-
remain all too high.
